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Summary 
Economic differences between countries and undertakings on a worldwide 
scale creates necessities for regulation on the granting of subsidies or State 
aid at the international level. In its absence, countries would be able to grant 
benefits to products and circumventing competition with unfairly 
displacement of goods that would have needed the same subsidies to have a 
decent chance at competing. This would contribute to an increased gap 
between the countries with more economic power and the countries with 
less economic power. Thus, an unstable world policy could, as a result, 
emerge.1  
 
The founding Member States of the EEC Treaty agreed on a common 
definition of the terminology around ‘state aid’ including the criteria which 
encompasses State aid; the elements of an advantage, selectivity, affection 
on trade, distortion of competition and originating from the State.2  
 
Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods, insofar as it affects trade between Member States. 
As have been previously mentioned, for a measure to constitute a State aid 
measure: four different cumulative criterion has to be met.3 However, when 
it comes to fiscal State aid, one can easily understand that the Commission 
can prove most of the criteria easily; National tax measures are set out by the 
Member State; underpayment of tax will create a downfall which will give 
an advantage; this advantage will possibly threaten to distort competition; 
                                                 
1 Luengo, G. p. 3-4. 
2 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 20. 
3 Article 107 (1) TFEU; see also Commission notice on the application of the State aid 
rules to measures relating to direct business taxation, (C/1998/384/03), paras 8-12. 
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and, if the distortion is substantial enough, can have an effect on trade 
between Member States.4  
The selectivity criterion is, one of the most defining criteria for State aid.5 
The criterion additionally raises complex questions to the fiscal measures 
since there is no community-level harmonisation of the tax provisions of the 
Member States.6 In addition to this, multinational companies pay taxes in 
different jurisdictions which have different tax rates. Therefore, the 
assessment of the compatibility within article 107 (1) TFEU must be done 
through the consistency of the national tax system of the State conferring 
the aid.7 
 
The Member States tax authorities may give companies specific rulings 
relevant to their business models to clarify how the undertaking will be 
taxable under certain circumstances. While such tax rulings are legal in 
general, they may violate State aid rules if they use methodologies to 
establish transfer prices with no economic justification that depart from the 
arm’s length principle and which unduly shift profit to reduce the taxes they 
pay. 
 
However, bearing in mind, that State aids traditionally have been tied to the 
State’s sovereignty, the regulation of State aid law is a delicate 
matter.8There is no surprising emotion, that the area at hand awakes rather 
large concerns from undertakings relying on a State’s fiscal autonomy. 
 
                                                 
4 Andrews, Philip & Ryan, Michael. The Apple Case, august, 2016. McCann FitzGerald. 
[Online] Available at: http://www.mccannfitzgerald.com/McfgFiles/knowledge/7300-
The%20Apple%20Case_1.pdf [Accessed 11 April. 2017]. 
5 C-200/97 Ecotrade, EU:C:1998:579, para 40; see also the opinion from the AG Fennelly 
on the same judgment C-200/97 Ecotrade, EU:C:1998:378, para 25; C-217/03 Belgium and 
Forum 187 v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, para 119; C-295/97 Rinaldo Piaggio, 
EU:C:1999:313, para 39; and C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, para 40. 
6 T-308/00 Salzgitter, EU:T:2004:199, para 81, furthermore; C-408/04 P Salzgitter, 
EU:C:2008:236. - The judgment was appealed and referred to the GC, although for other 
reasons not of importance. 
7 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 133. 
8 Luengo, G. p. 4. 
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This thesis reviews the legal, historical and modern scope of State aid 
applied to tax measures, especially when addressing the derogation method 
and the criterion of selectivity. It analyses the recent case-law and ends up in 
the conclusion of an area somewhat more transparent although with a 
remaining existing blur on matters relating to selectivity in tax measures 
especially when applying the derogation method in tax measures. 
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Sammanfattning 
Ekonomiska diskrepanser mellan länder och företag globalt skapar krav och 
behov för reglering av beviljande av bidrag eller statligt stöd på 
internationell nivå. I dess frånvaro skulle länder kunna ge vinster till 
produkter och kringgå konkurrens med otillbörlig förskjutning av varor som 
skulle ha behövt samma subventioner för att ha en ärbar chans att 
konkurrera med. Detta skulle bidra till ett ökat gap mellan medlemsstater 
med mer ekonomisk makt och de med mindre ekonomisk makt. Således, 
hade det gett bränsle åt en tillsynes instabil världspolitik  att emanera ifrån. 
 
De grundande medlemsstaterna i EEG-fördraget kom överens om en 
gemensam definition av begreppet "statligt stöd", inklusive de kriterier som 
omfattar statligt stöd. Elementen av en fördel, selektivitet, påverkan på 
handeln, snedvridning av konkurrensen och härrörande från staten. 
 
Artikel 107 (1) i TFEU-fördraget finner att något stöd som beviljas av en 
medlemsstat eller genom statliga medel, i vilken form som helst, som 
vanställer eller hotar att snedvrida konkurrensen genom att gynna vissa 
företag eller produktionen av vissa varor, i den mån det påverkar handeln 
mellan medlemsstaterna - är otillbörlig. 
 
Som tidigare nämnts måste en åtgärd för att kunna utgöra en statligt 
stödåtgärd, i EU:s mening, innehålla fyra olika kumulativa kriterier som 
måste vara uppfyllda.  
 
När det gäller statligt statsstöd i form av skatteåtgärder kan man dock lätt 
förstå att kommissionen enkelt kan bevisa de flesta kriterierna. Nationella 
skatteåtgärder fastställs av medlemsstaten. Underbetalning av skatt kommer 
att skapa en nedgång som kommer att ge en fördel för någon annan 
(selektivitet). Denna fördel kan eventuellt hota att snedvrida konkurrensen 
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och om förvrängningen är tillräckligt stor kan den påverka handeln mellan 
medlemsstaterna. 
 
Selektivitetskriteriet är ett av de mest definierande kriterierna för statligt 
stöd. Kriteriet ställer  komplexa frågeställningar eftersom det inte finns 
någon harmonisering på gemenskapsnivå av medlemsstaternas 
skattebestämmelser. Lägg till omständigheten att multinationella företag 
betalar skatter i olika jurisdiktioner som har olika skattesatser och resultatet 
av ett svårligen komplext rättsområde tar vid. Således måste bedömningen 
av förenligheten i artikel 107 (1) i TFEU-fördraget ske genom att det statliga 
skattesystemet i den stat som beviljar stödet överensstämmer. 
 
Medlemsstaternas skattemyndigheter kan ge företagen specifika beslut som 
är relevanta för deras affärsmodeller för att klargöra hur företaget ska bli 
skattepliktigt under vissa omständigheter. Medan sådana skattebeslut är 
lagliga i allmänhet kan de bryta mot reglerna om statligt stöd om de 
använder metoder för att fastställa överföringspriser utan ekonomisk 
motivering som avviker från armlängdsprincipen och som otillbörligt ändrar 
vinsten för att minska de skatter som de betalar. 
 
Men med tanke på att skatteåtgärder traditionellt har knutits till statens 
suveränitet är regleringen av statligt stöd en känslig fråga. Det finns inga 
överraskande känslor att det aktuella området väcker ganska stora farhågor 
från företag som åberopar en medlemsstats fiskala autonomi. 
 
Denna avhandling granskar det rättsliga, historiska och sedermera moderna 
utvecklade omfattningen av statligt stöd som tillämpas på skatteåtgärder 
inom EU, särskilt när man tar itu med undantagsmetoden och kriteriet för 
selektivitet. Den analyserar den senaste tidens rättspraxis och kommer fram 
till slutsatsen att transparensen inom rättsområdet inte är lika klart 
genomsyrat ur ett rättsdogmatiskt perspektiv. Det visar på ett väl 
genomarbetat område i konstant förändring med ett visst diffust 
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ställningstagande i  frågor som rör selektivitet i skatteåtgärder, särskilt vid 
tillämpning av undantagsmetoden vid skatteåtgärder. 
 7 
Acknowledgements 
After several years of legal studies at Lund University I can finally breathe 
out and start focusing on working within the law practice. I want to thank 
the student administration for their best efforts in taking care of me during 
my time at Lund. The past decade has been marked by times of joy, change 
and in the end finally the feeling of fulfilment.  
 
To my supervisor, Justin Pierce for his acknowledgement and understanding 
of my more “practical” rather than “theoretical” approach towards my legal 
studies. He has been one of the most influential persons I’ve stumbled upon 
during my academics. Some people just have the ability to inspire in ways 
they probably themselves wouldn’t imagine.   
 
Lastly but not least I want to thank everyone who has supported me during 
my continuous journey towards the end. It’s truly remarkable how fast time 
flies by…                 - And that’s a good thing! 
 
 
Non, je ne regrette rien, c’est la vie en rose! 
 
 
 8 
Abbreviations 
AG  Advocate General 
 
APA  Advanced Pricing Arrangements 
 
ALP  Arm’s Length Principle 
 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
COM  The European Commission 
 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
 
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community 
 
EEC  European Economic Community 
 
EC  European Commission 
 
EU  European Union 
 
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
 
GC  General Court 
 
NCA  National Competition Authorities 
 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
 
SAAP  State Aid Action Plan 
 
SAM  State Aid Modernisation Plan 
 
SCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures 
TEU Treaty on the European Union 
 
TFEU  Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
 
Union  The European Union 
 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 
 
 
 9 
1 Introduction  
State aids - a global welfare tool 
 
One of the most related consequences of globalization is the growing 
economic interdependence among countries. As a matter of fact, one of the 
main characteristics of the 21st century when it comes to describing the 
world is - interdependence. 9  
 
Economic differences between countries on a worldwide scale creates 
necessities for regulation on the granting of subsidies or State aid at the 
international level. In its absence, countries would be able to grant benefits 
to products and circumventing competition with unfairly displacement of 
goods that would have needed the same subsidies to have a decent chance at 
competing. This would contribute to an increased gap between the countries 
with more economic power and the countries with less economic power. 
Thus, an unstable world policy could emerge.10  
 
The use of subsidies, could correct market failures and achieve objectives, 
such as social goals, that the market could not achieve on its own. Hence, 
the use of subsidies would enhance global welfare and is therefore a great 
set of tools -  if used properly. However, bearing in mind, that State aids 
traditionally have been tied to the State’s sovereignty, the regulation of State 
aid law is a delicate matter.11  
 
The European Commission has been the pot stirrer in the interrelationship 
between national fiscal autonomy, larger multinational companies and the 
EU’s State aid rules. And when the Commission released its press release on 
                                                 
9 Jackson, J. Davey, W. and Sykes Jr, A. p. 1. 
10 Luengo, G. p. 3-4. 
11 Ibid. p. 4. 
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the 11 June 2014 stating that: “The Commission investigates transfer 
pricing arrangements on corporate taxation of Apple (Ireland), Starbucks 
(Netherlands,) Fiat Finance and Trade (Luxembourg)” the Commission 
initiated the contentious fiscal aid investigation that would lead to the 
largest fine in history of State aid; €13 billion, plus interest for Apple as it 
was announced in late august 2016.12 
 
The European Commission concluded that two tax rulings issued by Ireland 
to Apple did substantially and artificially lowered the tax paid by Apple in 
Ireland since 1991. Tax rulings have developed globally as a consequence of 
a change in mentality from tax authorities, an aspiration for a higher degree 
of tax compliance and securer economic investments from multinational 
corporations and tax filers, as a consequence of pursuit of legal certainty. 
Tax rulings are one of the instruments towards a more reciprocal 
relationship between the tax authorities and the taxpayer.13  
 
The rulings endorsed a way to establish the taxable profits for two Irish 
incorporated companies of the Apple group: Apple Sales International (ASI) 
and Apple Operations Europe (AOE). The Commission described that the 
companies: 14 
 
 “did not correspond to economic reality: almost all sales profits recorded 
by the two companies were internally attributed to a "head office"…. and 
were not subject to tax in any country under specific provisions of the Irish 
tax law, which are no longer in force. (cit.) 15 
 
                                                 
12 Press Statement by the European Commission, State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax benefits 
to Apple worth up to €13 billion, (2016). Hereinafter referred to as the ”Apple case”. 
13 Van De Welde, Elly, ’Tax rulings’ in the EU Member States – Study for ECON 
Committee, august, 2015. Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European parliament. 
[Online] Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/563447/IPOL_IDA(2015)5634
47_EN.pdf [Accessed 11 April. 2017]. 
14 Press Statement by the European Commission, State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax benefits 
to Apple worth up to €13 billion, (2016).  
15 Ibid. 
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As a result, the tax rulings endorsed an allocation which in turn resulted in 
that Apple only paid an effective corporate tax rate that declined from 1% in 
2003 to 0.005% in 2014 on the profits of Apple Sales International.16 
 
Since, the CJEU17 has held that, as a matter of principle, illegal State aids 
should be repaid as a logical consequence upon finding that the aids were 
unlawful.18 The remuneration applies for a ten-year period preceding the 
Commission’s initial request for information, making the recoveries too 
large to be disregarded by the the larger multinational corporations.  
 
Joaquín Almunia the Commission Vice President in charge of competition 
policy said in the first press release19 that:  
 
"In the current context of tight public budgets, it is particularly important 
that large multinationals pay their fair share of taxes. Under the EU's State 
aid rules, national authorities cannot take measures allowing certain 
companies to pay less tax than they should if the tax rules of the Member 
State were applied in a fair and non-discriminatory way."(cit.).20  
 
But what is the framework of European State aid, and how and can it apply 
to national tax regulations that normally would be perceived as to fall within 
the Member States national fiscal autonomy? Furthermore, how can a tax 
measure be classified as selective and then is it a natural part of a general 
tax system? 
 
 
                                                 
16 Press Statement by the European Commission, State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax benefits 
to Apple worth up to €13 billion, (2016). 
17 The Court of Justice of the European Union. 
18 See i.e. C-70/72 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of 
Germany, EU:C:1973:87, para 13; C-310/85 Deufil GmbH & Co KG v Commission, 
EU:C:1987:96; and C-277/00 Germany v Commission, EU:C:2004:238. 
19 Press Statement by the European Commission, State aid: Commission investigates 
transfer pricing arrangements on corporate taxation of Apple (Ireland) Starbucks 
(Netherlands) and Fiat Finance and Trade (Luxembourg), (2014). 
20 Ibid. 
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Purpose  
 
This thesis aims to describe what de lege lata of European State aid is and 
its development within the European legal framework to become a usable 
tool against unfair State-enforced endorsements to certain undertakings.  
 
The primary aim is to identify how Article 107 TFEU applies to tax 
measures, particularly in regards to the selectivity criterion. More exactly, 
the thesis aims to examine the application of the derogation method and the 
selectivity criterion and their relation. They are in my view, one of the most 
complex issues in the field of fiscal State aid. The partially secondary aim of 
the thesis is to present alternative reasoning’s for the reader to explore the 
application to tax measures as de lege feranda.  
 
In the newly cast spotlight the Apple case highlights the area of European 
State aid and national fiscal autonomy. The objective is to provide you as a 
reader a further understanding of the interrelationship between State aid 
rules and tax regulation and how the European State aid rules have a rather 
great effect and impact on the seemingly reserved right to the fiscal 
autonomy of the Member States.  
 
Methodology & Materials 
 
This thesis will adopt the legal dogmatic method with influence of the 
historical method. The legal dogmatic method will be mainly used for 
analysing the legislation and related cases on from the EU treaties, 
regulations and directives, case law from the CJEU, the decisions of the 
Commission, press release on these decisions, guidelines released by Union 
bodies, and study papers and reports released by the Commission. This is 
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used to examine de lege lata. Initially the scope will seemingly be wide, 
especially during the sections regarding to the evolution of European State 
aid rules, however this is necessary for the reader to then narrowly approach 
the question of how European State aid applies to tax measures, and 
specifically what kind of measures.  
 
It must be, additionally, noted that EU State aid rules are of great political 
interest, which creates a potential influence threat to the legal decision-
making. Nonetheless, this thesis aims to follow a legal analysis. 
 
Furthermore, by the utilisation of a descriptive legal dogmatic approach the 
thesis will provide the reader with the background information needed to 
understand this specific area within the legal framework within the 
European Union.  
 
The historical method will be used to illustrate the development of CJEU 
and the European Commission’s developed attitudes and objectives on State 
aid law since the beginning of the Union to now. The method will be used in 
a descriptive and illustrative way to present the reader about the shifting 
landscape of State aid rules and its objectives.  
 
The material aim is to provide a solid base of up to date literature mixed 
with a wide span of case law from both the CJEU but also the Court of First 
Instance. As the reader will acknowledge, the area of State aid is an 
everchanging legal entity with reformation, codification and a lot of 
guidelines. Therefore, I have included all the previously mentioned in 
addition to the decisions of the Commission, press release on these 
decisions, guidelines released by Union bodies, and study papers and reports 
released by the Commission. This documents in are in bibliographical sense 
described of the thesis referred as Commission Policy Framework others 
may find the definition of ‘soft-law’ as more appropriate. However, for the 
purpose of clarity and the discrepancies that to a certain extent exists by the 
 14 
Courts and the Commission under circumstantial aspects, I personally find 
the definition as framework more suitable for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
There are also some semi-new published articles included in the 
Bibliography, which provide both a practitioner’s approach as well as an 
emphasis on the overall public interest in European State aid law. The 
articles mainly relate and give emphasis to the Apple case which is one of 
the reasons they are included. 
 
Disposition 
 
The disposition of this thesis will be divided into chapters and sections.  
The Chapters will cover an overall area of interest and are very widely 
presented for the classification of subjects. The sections followed by sub-
sections on the other hand, will be more informative in regards to specific 
subjects that fall within the chapter. Of course, the more sub-sections in the 
more narrowly the scope of information will be. I will below describe the 
different chapters with highlighted sections of interest. 
 
In chapter 2 ‘State Aid Law’ the reader receives an overview of information 
with regards to EU State aid. The Chapter is divided into three main parts 
(General Objectives of State aid, State aid in the history of the European 
Union and The Legal Framework) where the two latter will go more into 
detail. The first part, General Objectives of State aid, will briefly discuss the 
incentives for State aid law.  
 
Secondly comes the State aid in the history of the European Union section. 
Here I will discuss the history, development and present de lege lata of 
European State aid. Within this section there will be an analogical 
timeframe from the birth of EU State aid to its present, this will be discussed 
in sections 2.1.1-2.1.4.  
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Lastly, I will in the section, The Legal Framework, discuss what the present 
legal frameworks scope is (section 2.1.5.) and how Article 107 (1) TFEU is 
applied in general including the different conditions that apply therein 
section (2.1.6).  
 
In chapter 3 ‘Selectivity in Tax Measures’ the reader is introduced to the 
concept of State aid through tax measures. As the reader, will understand, 
the area has is largely complex and to somewhat context controversial (this 
is further developed in chapter 4. Nonetheless, the reader is aimed to 
acknowledge the importance of the ‘when’ and ‘how’ of the selectivity 
criterion in tax measures. Therefore, in sections 3.1.1.-3.1.2 the view on tax 
measures in relation to selectivity, albeit its already narrowly kept legal 
areas will be presented generally. 
 
Furthermore, in chapter 3, the thesis casts light on the abovementioned 
derogation method. Here, midways, the thesis reaches its epicenter as to the 
conditions that have echoed the halls of the CJEU from undertakings’ 
commotion of legal disparity. The derogation method and its circumstantial 
criteria is explained in detail, in sections 3.1.2.1.-3.1.2.1.4.  
 
Moreover, in section 3.1.3 the reader is given the somewhat result and 
response from tax authorities around the different Member States to combat 
legal uncertainty and provide counsel within the area. A part of this counsel 
is in the form of advanced pricing agreements which will initially 
introduced in the first section (3.1.3). This is followed by the arm’s length 
principle and will hopefully enforce the critical thought of the reader to see 
all perspectives of State aid affecting national fiscal autonomy. This is 
further examined in the last part, albeit obviously, as the title entails 
describing the Commission’s view on tax rulings and State aid.  
 
Upon reaching chapter 4, the thesis has been structured to function as a 
balanced, somewhat, discrepant legal area for the purpose of having an 
unbiased reader towards the analysis. In this chapter I will analyse the recent 
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case-law and see if it’s in line with any parties’ view. Here I will develop 
more of the secondary aim of the thesis to hopefully provide insight to de 
lege ferenda within the relationship of selectivity and tax measures. This is 
shown in the personal remarks section (4.1.5) where I give a more personal 
view on the  
 
The analysis part is followed up by chapter 5, that entails a brief conclusion 
of remarks to the findings of the thesis. Lastly but not least the bibliography 
is found containing the bibliographical references for all the footnotes 
contained of the thesis therein. 
 
Delimitations 
 
Given the broad context of European State aid I have in this thesis made 
several delimitations which I will present, in general, below: 
 
No comparative analysis with other legal regulations outside the Union 
 
This thesis partially aims to give the reader a better understanding of 
European State aid law, its history and present. There is however, no 
comparison or comparative analysis with other governing State aid rules 
across the globe. It must therefore be taken into account that other 
regulatory systems such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade21 
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures22 of the 
World Trade Organization23 is not discussed but merely mentioned in the 
thesis.  
 
Notion of Undertaking 
 
                                                 
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade hereinafter referred GATT. 
22 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures hereinafter referred SCM. 
23 World Trade Organization hereinafter referred WTO. 
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The definition of an undertaking in the European legal context is not further 
discussed. The thesis is directed to people with a solid base of knowledge of 
EU legislation, thus certain definitions such as abovementioned have been 
disregarded. The thesis however, emphasises on legal statuses of 
undertakings when addressing the criterion of State origin (section 2.1.6.2.) 
as well as describing the selectivity criterion (section 2.1.6.4.). Furthermore, 
the notion of undertakings as economic operators in the context of the 
derogation method is, however, discussed upon as well. 
 
Focus on Article 107 (1) TFEU and the Selectivity Criterion and how it 
applies to tax measures 
 
Despite the wide notion of interest that emerges when citing the famous 
wording of Article 107(1), this thesis primarily aims to discuss in depth with 
regards to the criterion of Selectivity and its application in tax measures 
more specifically in tax rulings.  
 
Procedure and recovery  
 
Since, the CJEU has held that, as a matter of principle, illegal State aids 
should be repaid as a logical consequence upon finding that the aids were 
unlawful.24 The remuneration applies for a ten-year period preceding the 
Commission’s initial request for information, making the recoveries too 
large to be disregarded by the larger multinational corporations. The 
Articles governing this,108-109 TFEU, will not receive the same amount of 
emphasis, and are thus merely discussed upon.  Nor will the procedural 
rules in relation to Article 107 TFEU be discussed. It is important however 
to understand the concept and moreover I further advise to read upon legal 
certainty in relation to the recoveries, which I believe will give a better 
insight, as to the importance, for State aid. 
 
                                                 
24 See i.e. C-310/85 Deufil GmbH & Co KG v Commission, EU:C:1987:96; and C-277/00 
Germany v Commission, EU:C:2004:238. 
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2 State Aid Law  
General objectives for State aid 
 
The modern European economies rely heavily on markets and undertakings 
to decide what markets to expand into, what goods to sell and what R&D to 
undertake etc...  The underlying fundamental principle to ensure that the 
clockwork keeps on ticking is free competition based on equal and non-
discriminatory treatment of every undertaking will ensure optimal economic 
efficiency.25  
 
Hence, an uneven treatment towards certain undertakings in the form of 
State measures providing aid might level the playing field and may result in 
a distortion in competition. Exercising effective State aid control is, by no 
means, an easy task considering the size of the EU Internal Market and the 
differences both economically and socially between the Member States.26 
 
From a broad perspective, States give aid to achieve certain political 
objectives, policies or goals. For example, the State might be interested in 
maintaining certain industries in a region as it brings regional welfare, 
creates work opportunities for underrepresented members of the workforce 
and preserves economic development in that area.27  
 
Economists are persuaded by the quotation of the first and second welfare 
theorems, that State aid, with regards to certain circumstances, market 
                                                 
25 This principle is based on the belief that competitive markets are acting on an 
important role for liberty. Yergin, D & S, J. p.16-17. 
26 Pesaresi, N & Van Hoof, M. p. 4. 
27 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 3. 
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allocations will achieve static efficiency: no one can be better off without 
someone being worse off as a result.28 
 
By subsidising the industry or geographical area the State can attain policy 
goals without the utilisation of more traditional means of public law and 
control structures.29  
 
State Aid in the history of the EU 
 
In this section I will provide the reader a general descriptive history of 
European State aid and its objectives from its origins to its present role. 
From its commencement built up like the Fenix from the aftermath of World 
War II to the Modernisation of a structured complex area of European law. 
 
2.1.1 The Treaty of Paris and the European Coal 
and Steel Community 
 
The evolution of European State aids began with the Treaty of Paris in 
1951, which gave rise to the ECSC30. The objective at that time was to 
maintain post-war peace and reconcile two political powers, Germany and 
France. In an era marked by the restructuring of Europe, the most common 
aid was subjected to objectives within Research and Development.31  
 
Some years later, the Member States of the ECSC crated the EEC32. The 
EEC Treaty dealt with more general matters than the other treaties at the 
time (ECSC Treaty and the EAEC Treaty). One of the objectives set out by 
                                                 
28 Friederiszick, HW, Röller, L-H, Verouden, V. p. 632. 
29 OECD, Directorate for financial, fiscal and enterprise affairs committee on competition 
law and policy, Competition Policy in Subsidies and State Aid. p. 7-10. 
30 The European Coal and Steel Community. 
31 Luengo, G. p. 292. 
32 The European Economic Community. 
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the EEC Treaty was to integrate markets and encourage competition.  
Hence, the regulation of State aid was more detailed in the EEC Treaty, and 
were originally contained in Articles 92-94.33  
 
The founding Member States agreed on a common definition of the 
terminology around ‘State aid’ including the criteria which encompasses 
State aid; the elements of an advantage, selectivity, affection on trade, 
distortion of competition and originating from the State.34 Albeit, the 
Commission’s actions at the time to apply the regulation, mainly consisted 
in the form of the establishment of Commission Decisions, communications 
and guidelines for the Member States giving State aids.35 
 
2.1.2 Evolution on State aid, post the EEC 
Treaty 
 
Despite the fact, that State aids formed a part of the EEC Treaty the 
provisions had a rather unobtrusive role due to the abovementioned fact of 
the Commission’s actions.  Not until the 1970s and 1980s the control of 
State aids gained more importance since the attempts of creating a ‘real’ 
internal market. Many measures were hereinafter established, amongst them 
the adoption of the Single European Act in 1985. During this time the 
Commission relied heavily on private parties’ complaints in order to 
exercise its powers. The so called soft law or Commission Policy 
Framework issued during the 1970s and forward constituted for a long time 
the main tools for the regulation.36 Thus, the Commission started focusing 
more on State aids that distorted competition due to the current objective of 
a borderless community.37   
 
                                                 
33 Luengo, G. p. 293. 
34 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 20. 
35 Luengo, G. p. 294. 
36 Stefan, O. p. 52-53. 
37 Ibid. 
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One example of the Court and the Commissions new approach is shown in 
the Kohlgesetz case of 1973, were the Court manifests the principle of 
recovery of illegal aids based on Article 108 (3).38 It is important to bear in 
mind that the Treaty does not provide the recovery of unlawful and 
incompatible aids. Additionally, the CJEU in the abovementioned case 
established that the Commission was entitled to require the recovery.39 Even 
tough, it was not until the early 1980’s the Commission adopted its first 
recovery decision.40  
 
At the end of 1980s the Commission launched a new plan for revising its 
regulation of State aids. Calling for a more transparent and decisive 
approach due to the fact of an increased amount of received complaints with 
respect to European State aid.41  
 
2.1.3 The Golden Era: The 1990s 
 
The most significant period for development with respect to the regulation 
in State aids was during the 1990s. Not due to the fact of the introduction of 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 nor the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 but 
rather due to the Commissions actions and increased decisive control of the 
State aid regulation during the period. Thus, a lot of Commission decisions 
were delivered during the 1990s.42 
 
 The Commission published several sets of guidelines for a wide span of 
different sectors, so that both the Member States and the individuals 
subjected to aid would be able to examine the compatibility of the aid 
                                                 
38 C-70/72 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 
EU:C:1973:87, para 13. 
39 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 22. 
40 Commission Decision of 10 March 1982 concerning the aid granted by the Belgian 
Government to an industrial and commercial group manufacturing wall coverings, 
82/312/EEC, Official Journal L138, 19/51982.  
41 Luengo, G. p. 295. 
42 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 31. 
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received with the common market. In addition, the Commission established 
a de minimis threshold, where aids below the thresholds were presumed to 
cause no relevant distortion in competition.43   
 
2.1.4  The recent decade: A codification of 
modernisation 
 
Since, the past two decades the legal framework of State aid in the Union 
has gone through a review and produced a large amount of texts with the 
aim of making the legal framework simpler and more understandable as 
well as transparent in relation to State aid review. A so called ‘codification’ 
manifested in the Commissions Practice and the Courts case law.44  
 
The Commission saw a concern to scrutinize aid as being one of the key 
actions for the future of the internal market.45 Thus the contribution of tax 
policy to the Community objectives has been closely linked to the 
development of the Internal market.46 Two major measures must however 
be highlighted; The setup of the State Aid Action Plan in 2005.47 
Furthermore, the State Aid Modernisation initiative in 2012.48  
 
2.1.4.1 The State Aid Action Plan 2005-2009 
 
 
The setup of the State Aid Action Plan was not initiated as a result from the 
aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 contrary to popular belief. The 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44Ibid. p. 30. 
45 Steiner, J & Woods, L, p. 728. 
46 See the introduction to in Commission communication of 23 May 2001, Communication 
tax policy in the European Union – priorities for the years ahead. Brussels, 23.5.2001, 
COM (2001) 260 final. 
47 State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid 
reform, Brussels 2005-2009. 
48 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the committee of the Regions, EU State 
Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM/2012/0209. 
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Commission had planned the SAAP and acted on the SAAP long before the 
crisis.49 It was in March 2000 Member States of the EU met at the Lisbon 
summit to discuss the future and development of the EU. The result led to 
the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ with the focus to develop growth and employment 
within the Union. The ‘Lisbon Strategy’ marked a new period in the EU 
filled with modernisation and reform that had effect on all areas within the 
EU, including the EU State aid regulation.50 
 
The Commission sets out its current view about State aid control in the 
SAAP. The Commission starts off with emphasizing on the importance of 
competition with regards to the European economy that guarantees raising 
living conditions and the benefits and promotion of efficient allocation of 
resources.51 The objectives set out by the SAAP can be roughly categorized 
down to three types of groups; better targeted aids, a more economic 
approach, and lastly a more streamlined process.52  
 
2.1.4.2 The State Aid Modernisation Initiative 2012- 
 
 
Unlike the SAAP, The State Aid Modernisation Initiative shows more 
influences from the aftermath of the financial crisis.53 The State Aid 
Modernization Initiative was a large reform that was, with the support of the 
European parliament,54 instigated by Joaquín Almunia the Commission Vice 
President in charge of competition policy in 2012.55  
 
                                                 
49 Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot, 2012, p. 3 and 7. 
50 Bacon, K. p. 5. 
51 State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid 
reform, Brussels 2005-2009, paras 5-6. 
52 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 31. 
53 Ibid. p. 33. 
54 European Parliament, Resolution of 17 January 2013 on State Aid Modernisation, 
2012/2920(RSP). 
55 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the committee of the Regions, EU State 
Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM/2012/0209.  
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The initiative has three main closely linked objectives: The first one refers 
to foster growth in a strengthened, dynamic and competitive internal 
market.56 This objective is particularly important considering the aftermath 
of the financial crisis as it appears vital to strengthen the public incentives 
and imposing a better national budgetary discipline.57 
 
 The second objective refers to the focusing on cases with the biggest impact 
on the internal market.58 The Commission expresses a will to review the de 
minimis Regulation but also a prioritisation of measures covering large and 
potentially distortive aid, including fiscal aid.59  
 
The third objective refers to streamlining and faster decision making. The 
Commission states that:  
 
“Over time, State aid rules have developed into a complex legal framework. 
There is scope to clarify and simplify the rules, enhance consistency and 
streamline the assessment process. There is a need to better explain State 
aid concepts and to consolidate our horizontal and substantive rules.” 
(cit).60  
 
It is too early to assess the latest reform process, although the commission 
has emphasised the importance of transparency as one of the key 
components of modernization. 61 
 
                                                 
56 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the committee of the Regions, EU State 
Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM/2012/0209, para 2.1.   
57 Ibid, paras 3, 5. 
58 Ibid, para 2.2.  
59 Ibid, para. 19.  
60 Ibid, para 22.  
61 Communication from the Commission, Amending the Communication from the 
Commission on EU guidelines for the application of state aid rules in relation to the rapid 
deployment of broadband networks, on Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, on 
State aid for films and other audio-visual works, on Guidelines on State aid to promote risk 
finance investments and on Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines. COM 
2014/3349/2. p. 3. 
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2.1.5 Remarks 
 
Different opinions exist on what forces shaped European competition policy 
and the more decisive regulation of State aids, one of the opinions are that 
the ECJ at the time adopted a consistent and powerful competition doctrine 
set forth by two principal objectives: economic integration and the 
protection of competition ‘as such’, in other words – the Union had the task 
to ensure that the common market was not distorted.62  
 
As in most legal frameworks, the legal framework of European State aid has 
gone through several changes, reforms and reviews. There is still a margin 
of uncertainty however, State aid rules have, according to the doctrine, a 
distinctive feature in comparison to other areas of competition law and that 
is that there is a necessity for constant change and development.63 
 
 Bearing in mind of the historical aspects of European State aid law, what is 
proven is that the area is truly an ever-changing legal spine, unlike other 
competition law areas, where the Commissions policy framework brings 
flesh to the Court’s bones. One thing can be said for certain: and that is that 
both the Court and the Commission has served in pioneering roles in 
adjusting, designing and developing rule-makers.64  
 
The Legal Framework  
 
The first case65 where the concept of State Aid was mentioned was when the 
European Court of Justice stated that “in the sense in which they are 
normally defined, subsidies or aids granted by the States are incompatible 
                                                 
62 Ramírez Pérez, S. M. and Van de Scheur, S. p. 21-23 and 52-53. 
63 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 35. 
64 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 23-24. 
65 C-30/59, De gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority, EU:C:1961:2. 
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with the common market because they constitute an obstacle to one of its 
essential aims”.66 Additionally, the Court ruled that one of the principal 
tasks for the communities is to “ensure the establishment, maintenance and 
observance of normal competitive conditions.”.67 However, as mentioned 
earlier EU State aid rules was included in the Treaty of  Paris in 1951.68 
It’s evident that the court early on saw a potential competitive 
discouragement would arise if the Member States would start endorsing 
national undertakings and that derogations from the general principle must 
be construed narrowly.69  
In the following sections I will discuss the legal framework that lies at hand 
for when addressing EU State aid law.  
 
2.1.6 Scope 
 
The legality or otherwise of State aid granted by EU Member States is 
regulated by Articles 107-109 TFEU70 together with a large amount of case 
law, Commission decisions and guidelines. 71 The provisions confer powers 
to the Commission and the Council.72 As mentioned in the Delimitations 
section, this thesis aims towards the legal framework of State aid and 
focuses mainly on Article 107 (1) TFEU. Thus, for obvious clarifications, I 
will not discuss Articles 108-109 TFEU in the same extent as to Article 107 
TFEU. 
The following can be said with regards to the Commissions reformative 
work in previous sections: Contrary to the popular belief that the 
                                                 
66 Ibid, para 20. 
67 Ibid, para 20 (3). 
68 See section 2.1.1.1. 
69 see i.e. Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission, EU:C:2004:238, para 49, and Case C-
334/99 Germany v Commission, EU:C:2003:55, para 117.fy 
70 Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 2012/C-326/01. 
71 See Articles 107-109 TFEU. 
72 Cf. Article 13(2) TEU.  
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Commission desire for development in the area was a result of the aftermath 
of the financial crisis in 2008, the Commission had already plans on 
reforming the area since 2005, when it setup the State Aid Action Plan.73 
Furthermore, the European Commission adopted a Communication on State 
Aid Modernisation, setting out an ambitious reform package in 2012. 74  
The reforms aim was that State aid policy should focus on facilitating well-
designed aid targeted at market failures and prioritize the focusing on cases 
with the biggest impact on the internal market together with objectives of 
common European interest. 75 I ask the reader to bear this in mind when 
reviewing the following sections, and seek consensus as too why the Court 
has had the approach it has had throughout the case law when it comes to 
Article 107 (1) TFEU. 76 
 
2.1.7 Article 107 (1) TFEU 
 
Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods, insofar as it affects trade between Member States. The 
wording has been unchanged since the Treaty of Rome.77  
In order for a measure to constitute State aid, the following must be proven:  
It’s a measure  
(i) “granted by a Member State or through the State’s resources”78;  
                                                 
73 Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot, 2012, p. 3 and 7. 
74 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the committee of the Regions, EU State 
Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM/2012/0209. 
75 Ibid. paras 2.1-3.  
76 For more information about the reforms see section 2.1.1.4. 
77 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 1. 
78 See i.e. C-379/98 PreussenElektra v Schleswag, EU:C:2001:160, para 58; C-345/02 
Pearle, EU:C:2004:448, para 35; and C-303/88 Italy v Commission EU:C:1991:136, para 
11. 
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(ii) conferring an advantage (or “aid”) that is selective (i.e., that favours 
“certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”79);  
(iii) which “distorts or threatens to distort competition”80; and  
(iv) “affects trade between Member States”.81  
These four abovementioned conditions are cumulative; all must be fulfilled 
before the Member State measure will fall within the scope of Article 107 
TFEU.82 The article itself, doesn’t define State aid. The CJEU and 
Commission has thus, developed a broad view through its case law, 
decisions and guidelines. Where the raison d’être for the aid are not 
primarily relevant in the defining of aid, and where substance and not form 
is the criterion when defining aid.83  
 
I will for the sake of understanding Article 107(1) TFEU briefly go through 
the four different criterions in the following sections below.  
 
2.1.7.1 Objective definition of ‘Aid’ in the context of 
Article 107 TFEU  
 
The granting of an aid may take many forms.84 It includes direct grants, 
loans, guarantees capital investments and more. No actual transaction is 
necessary.85 The concept of aid within Article 107 (1) TFEU is a legal 
concept which is to be interpreted on the basis of objective factors.86  
                                                 
79 See i.e. C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, EU:C:2001:598, para 41; C-200/97 Ecotrade, 
EU:C:1998:579, para 40; and C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, para 40.  
80 See i.e. C-148/04 Unicredito, EU:C:2005:774, para 55; and C-372/97 Italy v 
Commission, EU:C:2004:234, para 44.  
81 C-280/00 Altmark Trans, EU:C:2003:415, para 74; and cf. Article 107 (1) TFEU.  
82 Craig, P & De Búrca, G, 2015. p. 1133. 
83 Ibid. See also C-173/73 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71; Case C-241/94 France v 
Commission, EU:C:1996:353. 
84 Cf. The wording of Article 107 (1) TFEU ‘...In any form whatsoever’. 
85 C-387/92, Banco Exterior de Espagna SA v Ayuntamiento de Valencia. EU:C:1994:100. 
para. 14.; joined cases C-399/10 P & C-401/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues Telecom v 
Commission and Others, EU:C:2013:175; C-404/97 Commission v Portugal, 
EU:C:1999:530.  
86 T-98/00 Linde v Commission, EU:T:2002:248, para 40; T-152/99 HAMSA v Commission, 
EU:T:2002:188, para 159; C-248/84 Germany v Commission, EU:C:1987:437, para 17; and 
C-83/98 P France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission, EU:C:2000:248, para 25. 
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“The concept of an aid is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces 
not only positive benefits, such as subsidies them self, but also interventions 
which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included 
in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being 
subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and 
have the same effect”. (cit).87  
 
Article 107 (1) TFEU does not distinguish the aids objectives or aims but 
rather it’s effects.88 Hence, there is no objective of general interest that per 
se would exclude the application of the Article.89 However, please note that 
this doesn’t contradict the principle that a measure which is excluded from 
the Article 107(1) due to the fact of  its nature  or general scheme of the 
system which then would result in it falling outside the scope of the 
selectivity criterion. 
 
In the joined cases C-399/10 P & C-201/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues 
Telecom v Commission and Others the CJEU expressed an opposite view 
from the GC and stated that the GC had wrongly required a close link 
between the advantage identified and the commitment from the States 
resources. The CJEU ruled that, according to the case-law, such 
correspondence was not necessary since a connection may very well be 
indirect.90  
 
Indirect measures may include measures that mitigate burdens normally 
included in the budget for certain undertakings that result in the equivalent 
                                                 
87 C-387/92, Banco Exterior de Espagna SA v Ayuntamiento de Valencia. EU:C:1994:100, 
para 13. 
88 C-173/73 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71, para 13; C-56/93 Belgium v Commission, 
EU:C:1996:64, para 79; C-310/85 Deufil GmbH & Co KG v Commission, EU:C:1987:96, 
para 8; C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, para 46; C-75/97 Belgium v Commission, 
EU:C:1999:311, para 25; and C-241/94 France v Commission, EU:C:1996:353 para 20. 
89 Bacon, K. p. 25. 
90 Joined cases C-399/10 P & C-401/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues Telecom v Commission 
and Others, EU:C:2013:175, paras 80, 89 and 99-102. 
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effect from subsidies.91 Moreover, a State aid may be granted through 
various forms of tax measures.92 
 
2.1.7.2 The State Origin Criterion 
 
State Aid means that the State favours a selected undertaking compared to 
others and is prohibited since the principle of equal treatment between 
private and public undertakings shall apply.93 The regulation of State aid 
does not only exist in the EU but also internationally, most known in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade94 and the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures95 of the World Trade Organization96.97 I will 
in the section (2.1.6-2) below disassemble the word and meaning of ‘State 
Aid’ in the context of Article 107 TFEU for the readers ability to further 
understand its context and regulation within the EU.  
 
2.1.7.2.1 Definition of ‘State’ in the context of Article 107 TFEU 
 
Defining whether a measure emanates from the State or not, is essential for 
the regulation of Article 107 TFEU. 98 The concept of by the State in the 
European State Aid Law does not limit its context to only include beneficial 
treatment from the central governance or highest authority of the Member 
States.99  
 
The definition of State is very broad and may include any body in the public 
sector which includes both regional and local bodies.100 Disregarded, their 
legal status.101  
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 C-173/73 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71, para 13. 
93 C-303/88, Italy v Commission, EU:C:1991:136, paras 19-20. 
94 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade hereinafter referred GATT. 
95 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures hereinafter referred SCM. 
96 World Trade Organization hereinafter referred WTO. 
97 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 66. 
98 Further discussed in section 2.3.2. 
99 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 1. 
100 Bacon, K. p. 26 and T-358/94 Air France v Commission, EU:T:1996:194, para. 57. 
101 C-78/76 Steinike und Weinling v Germany, EU:C:1997:52, para 21. 
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What is important is the following questions: firstly, is the resource within 
the public sector?102 Secondly, whether the State is liable, hence, in control 
to the direct usage of the aid or resource?103 If both questions are answered 
positively, the measure is considered in the European State Aid context to 
fall within the performance of the State.104 
 
2.1.7.2.2 The Imputability criterion 
 
It is well established in the case law that a measure is only State aid if it is 
attributable105 or imputable106 to the State. When legislative power is one of 
the constitutional powers of a State, aid resulting from legislative measures 
taken has to or at least appear to be imputable to the State.107 When a public 
authority grants an advantage to a beneficiary, the measure is by definition 
imputable to the State, even though the authority in question would enjoy 
legal autonomy from a public authority.108 Although, this will not be the 
case if the measure would derive from EU Legislation or the Member State 
is under an obligation to implement it under Union law.109 Regardless if the 
State has a choice to adopt legislation that would not distort competition.110 
 
Moreover, the Court has held that funds financed through compulsory 
charges imposed by the legislation of the Member State, thus dealt with in 
accordance with that legislation, can fall within the scope of Article 107 
                                                 
102 C-358/94 Air France v Commission, EU:T:1996:194, para. 56. 
103 C-482/99 France v Commission, EU:C:2002:294, para. 38. 
104 C-78/76 Steinike und Weinling v Germany, EU:C:1997:52, para 21. 
105 See Cases: T-358/94 Air France v Commission, EU:T:1996:194, para 61; C-303/88, 
Italy v Commission, EU:C:1991:136, para 11; and the combined Cases 67, 68, and 70/85 
Van der Kooy v Commission, EU:C:1988:38, para 28. 
106 See Cases: T-358/94 Air France v Commission, EU:T:1996:194, para 55; C-482/99 
France v Commission, EU:C:2002:294, para 24; and the joined Cases C-182/03 & C-
217/03 Belgium and Forum, 187 v Commission, EU:C:2005:266, para 127. 
107 T-358/94 Air France v Commission, EU:T:1996:194, paras 57 and 62. 
108 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 39. 
109 C-460/07 Sandra Puffer v Unabhängiger Finanzsenat, AuBenstelle Linz, 
EU:C:2009:254, para 70, See also Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred 
to Article 107 (1) TFEU, (C/2016/2946), para 44. 
110 T-351/02 Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission, EU:T:2006:104, paras 104-106. 
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TFEU to be classified as State resources, even though they are administered 
by entities separate from the public authorities.111 
 
The Commission has in its notice on the notion of State aid as referred to 
Article 107 (1) TFEU, (C/2016/2946), given a set of indicators for 
imputability.112 Amongst the indicators are the following; Public 
autonomy;113 factors of organic nature which link the public undertaking to 
the State;114 the undertaking considering directives issued by governmental 
bodies;115 the integration of the undertaking in the structures of the public 
administration;116the undertakings activities, for example, when a measure 
is taken to pursue a public policy goal;117 the legal status, although, as 
mentioned before the legal form is not sufficient enough to exclude 
imputability; 118 the degree of supervision and management of the 
undertaking by the public authorities;119 and lastly the scope, contents and 
conditions of the measure with regards to the likelihood of involvement of 
the public authorities.120 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 C-379/98 PreussenElektra, EU:C:2001:160, paras 57-58; and C-217/03 Belgium and 
Forum, 187 v Commission, EU:C:2005:266, para 128. 
112 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para; 43. See also: C-482/99 France v Commission, EU:C:2002:294, paras 
55 and 56; additionally the Opinion of the AG Jacobs to the judgment C-482/99 France v 
Commission, EU:C:2001:685, paras 65 and 68. 
113 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 43 (a).   
114 Ibid. (b). 
115 Ibid. (c), see also C-242/13, Commerz Nederland, EU:C:2014:2224, para 35. 
116 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 43 (d).   
117 Ibid. (e), see also T-387/11,Nitrogenmuvek Vegyipari, EU:T:2013:98, para 63 and T-
507/12 Slovenia v Commission, EU:T:2016:35, para 86. 
118 Ibid. (f); see also Bacon, K. p. 26; and T-358/94 Air France v Commission, 
EU:T:1996:194, para. 57. 
119 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 43 (g), see also the combined Cases 67, 68, and 70/85 Van der Kooy v 
Commission, EU:C:1988:38, para 36; T-358/94 Air France v Commission, EU:T:1996:194, 
para 57, and C-305/89 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1991:142, paras 14-16. 
120 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 43 (h). 
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2.1.7.3 The Distorion of Competion and its effect on 
trade 
 
Another condition under Article 107 (1) is that it has to be a measure that  
“distorts or threatens to distort competition”121; and “affects trade between 
Member States”.122 These two conditions are often considered together. 123 
For practical purposes the Commission states in its notice, on the notion of 
State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, that in cases where the State 
grants a financial advantage to an undertaking in a liberalised sector this is 
often considered to distort or threaten to distort competition.124 
 
2.1.7.3.1 Distortion of Competition 
 
The often characteristically referred test for distortion of competition is 
whether the aid strengthens the position of the undertaking in relation to its 
competitors.125 Furthermore, compare this fact with what has been 
previously stated in regards to the Economists welfare theorems.126 
Moreover, the Commission does not need to establish the existence of actual 
competitors on the specific market affected.127 
 
                                                 
121 C-148/04 Unicredito, EU:C:2005:774, para 55; and C-372/97 Italy v Commission, 
EU:C:2004:234, para 44.  
122 C-280/00 Altmark Trans, EU:C:2003:415, para 74; cf. Article 107 (1) TFEU.  
123 See Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 186; T-288/97 Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission, 
EU:T:2001:115, para 41; and joined Cases T-298/97, 312-3/97, 315/97, 600-7/97, 1/98, 3-
6/98, and 23/98 Alzetta Mauro v Commission, EU:T:2000:151, para 81.  
124 See C-730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, EU:C:1980:209, para 11; 
Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 271; joined Cases T-298/97, 312-3/97, 315/97, 600-7/97, 1/98, 3-6/98, 
and 23/98 Alzetta Mauro v Commission, EU:T:2000:151, and C-280/00 Altmark Trans, 
EU:C:2003:415. 
125 C-730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, EU:C:1980:209, para 11; and C-
148/04 Unicredito, EU:C:2005:774, para 56.  
126 Friederiszick, HW, Röller, L-H, Verouden, V. p. 632; see also the section ’General 
Objectives’. 
127 See for ex. the Opinion of the AG Darmon to the joined Cases C-72/91 and 73/91 Firma 
Sloman Neptun Schifffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun 
Schiffahrts AG, EU:C:1992:130, para 61. 
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2.1.7.3.2 Affecting intra-Member States’ trade 
 
When addressing the condition of the measure considered to be an 
encumbrance for intra-Member States’ trade, the amount or size of the 
beneficiary are irrelevant.128 Since, a very low amount might still potentially 
affect the competition in areas where the competition is very high.129  
In the famous case Heiser130 the CJEU ruled that despite the low amounts of 
aid to medical practitioners in Austria, it was ‘not inconceivable’ that the 
practitioners would be in competition with those established in another 
Member State.131 
It might be hard to see, given the abovementioned facts and wide scope the 
Commission has set out for measures to fall within the inter-State trade, how 
a measure would exist exemptions of the general rule that is having a 
potential affect on inter-State trade. However, there is some exceptions to 
the general rule. In the case Italy and Sardegna Lines v Commission, the 
Court ruled that the Commission had failed to take into account that the 
subjected market at the time had not been liberalised.132  A similar decision 
was adopted by the Commission later on.133 However, there are limited 
situations when an undertaking will be able to claim the absence of effect in 
intra-Member States’ trade. 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 C-280/00 Altmark Trans, EU:C:2003:415, para 81; C-351/98 Spain v Commission, 
EU:C:2002:530, para 67; and T-55/99 Confederación Española de Transporte de 
Mercancías v Commission, EU:T:2000:223, paras 89 & 94. 
129 C-303/88, Italy v Commission, EU:C:1991:136 para 27; and C-259/85 France v 
Commission, EU:C:1987:478, para 24. 
130 C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130. 
131 Ibid, paras 33, 35; Furthermore, see the Opinion of AG Tizzano in the same judgement, 
EU:C:2004:678, para 58. 
132 Cases C-15/98 & C-105/99 Italian Republic and Sardegna Lines v Commission, 
EU:C:2000:570, paras 68-70. 
133 See Commission Decision of 20 July 2007, Aid to the Sardinian shipping sector, 
2008/92/EC, Official Journal L29/24. 
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2.1.7.3.3 De minimis rules 
 
Even though the possibility to fall outside the scope due absence of effect in 
intra-Member States’ trade is relatively small,134 all aids do not have a 
perceptible impact on trade and competition which is why the Commission 
developed a set of rules that regulated and reformed the so called de 
mimimis aids since 2001.135 The Commission had actually been searching 
for a legal basis for the de minis rules since 1992, but it wasn’t until the 
Enabling Regulation was introduced in 1998 that the legal basis was found 
for certain State aids.136 
The main purpose of the de minimis rules are to provide exemption for aid 
that amount to smaller sums to ease the workload of the Commission.137The 
CJEU has however not recognized a general de minimis rule.138 
Seeing as the Court, has consistently held that there is an insignificance in 
relation to the amount of the aid for it to potentially distort competition and 
affect trade between the Member States, one can say that the CJEUs attitude 
towards the de minimis is different than that of the Commission. 139 The 
Court has held a close grip around that even though the benefit of an aid is 
                                                 
134 See section above 2.1.6.3.2. Affecting intra-Member States’ trade. 
135 Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 87 & 88 of the EC Treaty to de 
minimis aid, 2001/69/EC, Official Journal L10/30; and Commission Regulation on the 
application of Articles 87 & 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, 2006/1998/EC, Official 
Journal L379/5; and the recent one Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 
107 & 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, 
2013/1407/EU, Official Journal L352/1. 
136 See Council Regulation on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal aid, 
1998/994/EC, Official Journal L142/1. 
137 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 160. 
138 See i.e. Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission, EU:C:2004:238, paras 39 & 40; C-
172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, para 34; joined Cases T-298/97, 312-3/97, 315/97, 600-
7/97, 1/98, 3-6/98, and 23/98 Alzetta Mauro v Commission, EU:T:2000:151, para 86; C-
409/00 Spain v Commission, EU:C:2003:92, para 76; C-382/99 Netherlands v Commission, 
EU:C:2002:363, paras 59 & 60. 
139 C-57/86 Greece v Commission, EU:C:1988:284, paras 17 & 18; C-310/99 Italy v 
Commission, EU:C:2002:143, para 86; and C-142/87 Belgium v Commission, 
EU:C:1990:125, para 43. 
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limited to the undertaking, competition is, to a lesser extent, still 
distorted.140  
 
 
2.1.7.4 The Selectivity Criterion 
 
Article 107 (1) TFEU bears the condition that the aid must “…favour 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods…”.141 It is one of 
the most defining criteria for State aid.142It is also one of the cornerstones in 
this thesis.  
 
It is found through the CJEU case-law that the term of ‘undertaking’ covers 
any entity which transmits in any economic activity, disregarded the legal 
status or method of financing the entity has.143 A measure is in principle 
considered selective if it produces an advantage for certain undertakings or a 
certain area of activity.144 Disregarded, if the aid was not aimed at one or 
more recipients in advance.145  
 
Aid can be considered selective, even though it covers the whole of an 
economic sector.146 However, general tax measures, arrangements for 
                                                 
140 T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v Commission, EU:T:1998:77, para 46; see also T-55/99 
Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías v Commission, EU:T:2000:223, 
para 94. 
141 Wording from Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
142 C-200/97 Ecotrade, EU:C:1998:579, para 40; see also the opinion from the AG Fennelly 
on the same judgment C-200/97 Ecotrade, EU:C:1998:378, para 25; C-217/03 Belgium 
and Forum 187 v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, para 119; C-295/97 Rinaldo 
Piaggio, EU:C:1999:313, para 39; and C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, para 40. 
143 C-41/90 Höfner and Elser, EU:C:1991:161, para 21; joined cases C-159/91 & C-160/91 
Poucet and Pistre, EU:C:1993:63, para 17, C-244/94 Fédération Française des Sociétés 
d’Assurance, EU:C:1995:392, para 14; and joined cases C-180/98 & C-184/98 Pavel 
Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten EU:C:2000:428, paras 
74-76. 
144 T-152/99 HAMSA v Commission, EU:T:2002:188, para 156; and T-210/02 British 
Aggregates v Commission, EU:T:2006/253, para 105. 
145 T-55/99 Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías v Commission, 
EU:T:2000:223, para 40; and T-379/09 Italy v Commission , EU:T:2012:422, para 47. 
146 Nielsen,  M & Vesterdorf, P. p 23; The authors reference to the cases C-148/04 
Unicredito, EU:C:2005:774 & C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130. 
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taxation, tax deduction that are regarded as general or economic policy 
measures can fall outside of the Article 107 (1) TFEU scope.147 As a result 
the line between a general tax measure and a selective tax measure is often 
sprung into the air of discussion and debate.  This I will return to discuss 
further in the thesis under chapter 3. 
 
 
2.1.7.4.1 General measures 
 
Since Article 107 (1) TFEU bears the condition that the aid must “…favour 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods…”.148 It e contrario 
follows that a measure which benefits all operators within the national 
territory, without distinction, does not constitute State aid.149 
 
In virtue a general measure entails a measure that favours all undertakings 
as well as their competitors in different Member States.150 
 
2.1.7.4.1.1 Regional general measures 
 
When a measure applies to all operators within a specific region the measure 
might, under certain circumstances, be considered as general. This is 
particular in tax measures, however if the measure contains a criterion 
relating to a specific territory of the Member State it may very well be 
considered as State aid.151 
 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
148 Wording from Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
149 C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, EU:C:2001:598, para 35; and Opinion of AG Alber on 
the judgment Spain v Commission, EU:C:2002:475, paras 60 & 65. 
150 Cf. Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation, (C/1998/384/03), para 13. 
151 T-308/00 Salzgitter, EU:T:2004:199, para 38; see also C-248/84 Germany v 
Commission, EU:C:1987:437, paras 18-19.  
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If a regional authority has the fiscal autonomy to set a lower tax rate than 
another region, this does not de facto constitute a measure of State aid.152  
 
Three different scenarios was outlined by AG Geelhoed and accepted by the 
court in the case Portugal v Commission, when it comes to fiscal measures 
and regional autonomy: 
1. Cases where the central government unilaterally adopts a tax rate 
that is reduced in a particular area within the State. The measure is 
likely to be regarded as selective as it only applies to a part of the 
entire State.153 
2. Cases where the fiscal competence is distributed, resulting in all 
local authorities enjoying the fiscal autonomy to set the rates 
differently. This would according to AG Geelhoed not be considered 
as selective due to the fact that there wouldn’t exist any normative 
(standard) tax rate to derogate from.154 
3. The last category of cases is when the regional or local authorities 
have full fiscal autonomy and adopts a tax rate lower than the rest of 
the Member State. This could mean that the given tax measure 
would result in an equal treatment of all undertakings in the given 
region to have the same applicable tax rate. This would then 
according to the AG Geelhoed not be qualified as selective.155 
 
2.1.7.4.2 De jure and de facto selectivity 
 
The material selectivity of a measure that would fall within Article 107 (1) 
TFEU suggests that the measure may only be applicable to certain 
                                                 
152Cf. C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, EU:C:2006:511, para 57; and also joined cases C-
428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-Rioja) and Others v 
Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya and others, EU:C:2008:488, para 47. 
153 Opinion of AG Geelhoed to the judgment C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, 
EU:C:2005:618, para 51. 
154 Ibid, paras 52 & 53; see also section 3.1.2.1. 
155 Ibid, para 54; see also joined cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de 
Trabajadores de La Rioja (UGT-Rioja) and Others v Juntas Generales del Territorio 
Histórico de Vizcaya and others, EU:C:2008:488, paras 53-60.  
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undertakings or certain sectors of economy in the State. The material 
selectivity is recognized as either de jure or de facto.156  
 
De jure selectivity is the outcome from measures that have formal 
legislative reasons for granting the measure. Thus, aimed at certain 
undertakings by the measure being reserved for certain actors on the market 
with certain size or legal form;157  
 
De facto selectivity is when the application of the measure is hindered 
through general terms that applies only to a specific group. Including the 
fact if granted for just a short period.158 Consequently, creating barriers for 
other undertakings from benefitting from the measure.159  
 
As one can understand the criterion of selectivity is highly contentious, 
within the context of fiscal matters which the Commission in its notice160 
states the following: 
 
 “States are free to decide on the economic policy which they consider most 
appropriate and, in particular, to spread the tax burden as they see fit 
across the various factors of production. Nonetheless, Member States must 
exercise this competence in accordance with Union law.”(cit.).161  
 
The paragraph refers to the States fiscal autonomy with the limitation to 
follow Union law. In the following chapter (3) I will go through and analyse 
                                                 
156 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 120.  
157 Ibid. para 121; and Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/08 & C-80/08 Paint Graphos and 
others, EU:C:2011:550, para 52. 
158 Joined Cases T-239/04 & T-323/04, Italy & Brandt Italia v Commission, 
EU:T:2007:260, para 66; T-211/05 Italy v Commission, EU:T:2009:304, para 120; and C-
458/09 P Italy v Commission, EU:C:2011:769, paras 59 & 60. 
159 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), paras 121-122; and T-92/00 and T-103/00 Ramondín SA and Ramondín 
Cápsulas SA v Commission, EU:T:2007:260, para 39. 
160 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946). 
161 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 156; See also C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, EU:C:2009:559, para 34. 
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the criterion of selectivity in relation to tax measures and national fiscal 
autonomy. 
 41 
3 Selectivity in Tax Measures 
As have been previously mentioned, for a measure to constitute a State aid 
measure: four different cumulative criterion has to be met.162 However, when 
it comes to fiscal State aid, one can easily understand that the Commission 
can prove most of the criteria easily; National tax measures are set out by the 
Member State; underpayment of tax will create a downfall which will give 
an advantage; this advantage will possibly threaten to distort competition; 
and, if the distortion is substantial enough, can have an effect on trade 
between Member States.163  
The selectivity criterion is, one of the most defining criteria for State aid.164 
The criterion additionally raises complex questions since there is no 
community-level harmonisation of the tax provisions of the Member 
States.165 Therefore, the assessment of the compatibility within article 107 
(1) TFEU must be done through the consistency of the national tax system 
of the State conferring the aid.166 
 
Furthermore, the Court has ruled that even though the Member State when it 
adopted the measure resolved to a tax that in turn would approximate to 
other Member States is not excluding the measure to the application of the 
article.167 
 
                                                 
162 Article 107 (1) TFEU; see also Commission notice on the application of the State aid 
rules to measures relating to direct business taxation, (C/1998/384/03), paras 8-12. 
163 Andrews, Philip & Ryan, Michael. The Apple Case, august, 2016. McCann FitzGerald. 
[Online] Available at: http://www.mccannfitzgerald.com/McfgFiles/knowledge/7300-
The%20Apple%20Case_1.pdf [Accessed 11 April. 2017]. 
164 C-200/97 Ecotrade, EU:C:1998:579, para 40; see also the opinion from the AG Fennelly 
on the same judgment C-200/97 Ecotrade, EU:C:1998:378, para 25; C-217/03 Belgium and 
Forum 187 v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, para 119; C-295/97 Rinaldo Piaggio, 
EU:C:1999:313, para 39; and C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, para 40. 
165 T-308/00 Salzgitter, EU:T:2004:199, para 81, furthermore; C-408/04 P Salzgitter, 
EU:C:2008:236, - The judgment was appealed and referred to the GC, although for other 
reasons not of importance. 
166 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 133. 
167 Joined Cases 6/69 & 11/69 Commission v France, EU:C:1969:68, para 21. 
 42 
 The Court has, however, developed a general rule, which often is referred 
to as the ‘derogation method’168 when a tax measure is considered 
compatible with the internal market because it is justified by the nature or 
general scheme of the system which it is part or by the logic of the 
system.169  
 Hence, the question of ‘selectivity’ is probably a key argument and issue 
raised by Apple Inc. and the Republic of Ireland in the event of an appeal: 
was Apple’s subsidiaries’ tax arrangements selective? – or were the same tax 
rulings available to others in a comparable situation.170  
I will get back to the ‘derogation method’ and discuss it in relation to the 
selectivity criterion in the following sections along with how European State 
aid rules have a rather intrinsically importance to certain measures that, in 
some cases, would be seen as a natural part of the Member States fiscal 
autonomy. 
 
3.1.1 How and when does State aid apply to tax 
measures? 
 
In 1998, the Commission issued a notice on the application of State aid law 
to “tackle harmful tax competition”.171 The Commission reiterated its 
position stating that: 
                                                 
168 Opinion of the AG Darmon to the joined Cases C-72/91 and 73/91 Firma Sloman 
Neptun Schifffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG, 
EU:C:1992:130, para 50. 
169 C-173/73 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71, para 15; joined Cases C-72/91 & C-73/91 
Firma Sloman Neptun Schifffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun 
Schiffahrts AG, EU:C:1992:130, para 21. 
170 Andrews, P & Ryan, M. The Apple Case, august, 2016. McCann FitzGerald. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.mccannfitzgerald.com/McfgFiles/knowledge/7300-
The%20Apple%20Case_1.pdf [Accessed 11 April. 2017]. 
171 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation, (C/1998/384/03). 
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 “in applying the Community rules on State aid, it is irrelevant whether the 
measure is a tax measure, since Article 92 (Current Article 107 TFEU) 
applies to aid measures ‘in any form whatsoever’.”. (cit.).172  
However, since then, the fiscal State aid has developed considerably both in 
its broad range and complexity.173 
It falls within the competence of the Member States or of infra-State bodies 
having fiscal autonomy, in the absence of European Union rules governing 
the matter, to designate bases of assessment and to spread the tax burden 
across the different factors of production and economic sectors.174 
The general objectives of the EU tax policy the Commission states in their 
report from 2001 is to focus on the removal of tax obstacles to exercise the 
four freedoms. And that the allocation of State resources must be made clear 
to the intended economic agents. Thus tax systems must be made simpler and 
transparent.175  
 In other words, direct taxation falls within the scope of the competence of 
the Member States and the Member States retain the right to set the manner 
(i.e., taxes on sold goods, taxes on property etc.) by which, and extent to 
which (i.e., taxable proportion of profits), direct taxation applies to 
corporations, so long as the national measures comply with State aid rules.176 
If a derogation from a normal tax system does not apply on a general basis it 
may be considered as selective and thus fall within Article 107 TFEU.  
Although the Apple case undoubtedly raises novel issues and awakes a 
broader spectrum of interest amongst people with regards to the €13 billion 
recovery fine and the current stir the competition legal area has seen over 
                                                 
172 Ibid, para 8. 
173 Craig, P & De Búrca, G. p. 1133-37. 
174 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 156; See also C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, EU:C:2009:559, para 34. 
175 Commission communication of 23 May 2001, Communication tax policy in the 
European Union – priorities for the years ahead. Brussels, 23.5.2001, COM (2001) 260 
final, para 2.3. 
176 Ibid; and C-106/09 Commission v Gibraltar,EU:C:2011:732, para. 97. 
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the recent years,177 fiscal State aid has been recognised by the European 
Courts since the 1960s.178 
In the famous case 30/59 De gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v 
High Authority, Germany had introduced a bonus to miners, which gave all 
miners working underground a tax-free shift bonus paid by the undertakings 
through a deduction from taxes paid on wages. The Court therefore held in 
the case that the shift bonus relieved the undertakings from an expense they 
would other have had.179  
 What is essential to understand is when a fiscal State measure is considered 
selective and consequently applies to Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
 
3.1.2 When is a fiscal State measure labelled 
‘selective’? 
 
As mentioned above, a fiscal or economic benefit granted by a Member 
State constitutes State aid only if, by displaying a degree of selectivity, a 
State measure which benefits all undertakings which are in a similar legal or 
factual situation within the national territory without distinction cannot, 
therefore, constitute State aid.180 Hence, any derogations made from the 
normal taxation rules that does not apply on a general basis for all relevant 
undertakings, that is in a “legal or factual situation that is comparable in the 
                                                 
177 Heath, R & Hirst, N. In Apple case, Europe thinks different, august, 2016. POLTICO. 
[Online] Available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/in-apple-case-europe-thinks-different/ 
[Accessed 24 April 2017]. 
178 C-30/59, De gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority, EU:C:1961:2. 
179 Ibid, para 20. 
180 Nicolaides, P, Kekelekis, M & Kleis, M. p. 32; C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, 
EU:C:2001:598, para 35; For additional reference, see section 2.1.6.4. 
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light of the objective pursued by the measure”(Cit.)181 in a Member State 
may be selective.182  
In the commissions notice183 the commission expresses that depending on 
which Member State and on the status of the undertaking, tax rules apply 
differently. Furthermore, that rules which accord to preferential treatment 
towards undertakings having certain legal status and carrying out an 
economic activity, may constitute State aid according to Article 107(1) 
TFEU.184  
 
The Commission very clearly states in their notice185 that Member States 
freely can decide upon the most appropriate economic policy and tax burden 
they see fit and fall within their competence due to natural fiscal autonomy. 
However, when exercising such policies must be in compliance with Union 
Law.186 The World Duty Free Group and Banco Santander cases proved 
that there was and still is a seemingly apparent legal hotspur within the area 
of European State aid;187 it is not clarified and settled in how the selectivity 
criterion ought to be interpreted in fiscal State measures. 
 
3.1.2.1 The Derogation Method 
 
The selective advantage may derive from an exemption to the tax provisions 
of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature or from a discretionary 
                                                 
181 C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, EU:C:2001:598, para 41; and C-75/97 Belgium v 
Commission, EU:C:1999:311, paras 28-31. 
182 C-75/97 Belgium v Commission, EU:C:1999:311. paras 34-35; furthermore, see section 
2.1.6.4.1. 
183 Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation, (C/1998/384/03). 
184Ibid, para 19. 
185 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946). 
186 Ibid, para 156. 
187 Joined Cases C-20/15 P & C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free Group SA, 
(formerly Autogrill España SA), Banco Santander SA & Santusa Holding SL, 
EU:C:2016:981. Appealed, overruled and referred back to the General Court by the CJEU. 
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practice on the part of the tax authorities. However, the selective nature of a 
measure may be justified by ‘the nature or general scheme of the system’. 188 
 
 Sometimes the justification has also been referred by the Court as the 
‘nature or structure’ or ‘logic’ of the system, and applies almost exclusively 
to tax measures.189 This is what sometimes is called as the ‘derogation 
method’.190  
 
The derogation method has been recognised by both the Courts191 and the 
Commission since the First Survey on State aid rules applied to tax 
measures.192 
 
The test for whether a measure can be justified on aforementioned grounds 
relates to the internal functioning of the fiscal system and not to external 
objectives assigned to it.193 The Court has consistently held that Article 107 
(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by 
                                                 
188Ibid, para 12; C-173/73 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71, para 15; joined Cases C-
72/91 & C-73/91 Firma Sloman Neptun Schifffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer 
der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG, EU:C:1992:130, para 21. 
189 Kociubinski, J, Selectivity Criterion in State Aid Control, 2012. Wroclaw Review of 
Law, Administration & Economics. De Gruyter. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/wrlae.2012.2.issue-1/wrlae-2013-0016/wrlae-2013-
0016.xml?format=INT [Accessed 27 April 2017]. 
190Cf. Opinion of the AG Darmon to the joined Cases C-72/91 and 73/91 Firma Sloman 
Neptun Schifffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG, 
EU:C:1992:130. 
191 The derogation method has consistently been up on the table however the CJEU has 
been reluctant in the conclusion that selectivity can only stem from a system to which all 
the undertakings are subject see i.e. joined Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09 P Commission and 
Spain v Government of Gibraltar and UK, EU:C:2011:732, para 92. 
192 Commission Survey on 13 December 1988, First Survey on State Aids in the European 
Community, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
SEC (88) 1981 final. p. 6-8. 
193 C-173/73 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71, para 15; joined Cases C-72/91 & C-73/91 
Firma Sloman Neptun Schifffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun 
Schiffahrts AG, EU:C:1992:130, para 21; C-75/97 Belgium v Commission, EU:C:1999:311, 
paras 33-34; C-390/98 H.J Banks v The Coal Authority and Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry,  EU:C:2001:456, paras 33 & 43; C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, 
EU:C:2001:598, para 42; C-159/01 Netherlands v Commission, EU:C:2004:246, para 42; 
Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/08 & C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others, EU:C:2011:550, para 
64; and joined Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and UK, EU:C:2011:732, para 145. 
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reference of their objectives, but rather defines the effects and the 
techniques used to attain such objectives.194 
 
The CJEU has ruled that in order to justify a selective measure on the basis 
of the ‘nature of the system’ it is necessary for such a measure to be 
supported with specific and detailed argumentation. Leaving the burden of 
proof entirely on the Member States and keeping the exemption from the 
rule narrowly.195 In that context, in order to classify a national tax measure 
as selective the Commission must conduct a three-step test commencing 
with; 
a. identifying the ordinary or ‘normal’ tax system applicable, and 
thereafter demonstrate that;  
b. the tax measure is a ‘derogation’ from that ordinary reference 
system or general scheme in the sense that it differentiates from 
other operators that are in a comparable factual and legal situation; 
196  and lastly;  
c. that the measure is not justified by ‘the nature or general scheme of 
the system’. 197 
The three components of the test will be presented followingly.  
 
3.1.2.1.1 First step: Identification of the reference system 
 
The reference system constitutes the frame of which the selectivity of the 
measure is assessed.198 It consists of a system of general applicable rules – 
                                                 
194 T-210/02 British Aggregates v Commission, EU:T:2006/253, paras 85 & 89; joined 
Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and UK, 
EU:C:2011:732, para 87; and C-279/08 P Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2011:551, para 
51. 
195 Opinion of the AG Cosmas to the judgment C-83/98 P France v Ladbroke Racing & 
Commission, EU:C:1999:577, para 26. 
196 Joined Cases C-20/15 P & C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free Group SA, 
(formerly Autogrill España SA), Banco Santander SA & Santusa Holding SL, 
EU:C:2016:981, para 57. 
197Ibid. para 12;  C-173/73 Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71, para 15; joined Cases C-
72/91 & C-73/91 Firma Sloman Neptun Schifffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer 
der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG, EU:C:1992:130, para 21. 
198 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 132. 
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on the basis of objective criteria, to all economic entities falling within the 
scope of the objective.199 
 
In tax measures the reference system can be based on elements such as the 
tax base, tax rate, the entities taxable and so on. For example, it can be 
identified within the general VAT-system200 or the corporate income tax 
system.201  
 
A common mistake is to regard the system as in the means of the aid itself, 
and reason the measure by policy justifications. The result would entail 
every aid as justified by itself. Hence, it is important to view the system in a 
wider context. Furthermore to look at the amount of operators that fall 
within the scope of the measure, and more importantly the ones that 
don’t.202 
 
3.1.2.1.2 Second step: Scope of operators in a comparable legal 
and factual situation 
 
One of the most problematic issues with the derogation test is that the CJEU 
determines which operators that are to be taken into account.203 Furthermore 
when assessing if the undertakings are in the same legal and factual 
situation the Court frequently looks at the perspective of the objectives of 
the measure.204 
 
As an example: In the CJEU judgment  Adria-Wien Pipeline and 
Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke205 the Court examined the tax 
                                                 
199 Ibid, para 133. 
200 C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, para 40. 
201 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 134; Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/08 & C-80/08 Paint Graphos and 
others, EU:C:2011:550, para 50;  Cases C-182/03 & C-217/03 Belgium and Forum, 187 v 
Commission, EU:C:2005:266, para 95; and C-66/02 Italy v Commission, EU:C:2005:768, 
para 100. 
202 Bacon, K. p. 92. 
203 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 135. 
204 Ibid. 
205 C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, EU:C:2001:598. 
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regime regarding the gas and electricity consumption aimed at reducing 
emissions. Instead of narrowly scope the subjected undertakings to only 
include the ones manufacturing goods, the CJEU stated that, in light of the 
perspective of the objective for the measure – to reduce energy 
consumption, whether supplying services or manufacturing goods the 
energy consumption of the sectors were equally harmful, thus it widened the 
scope and included both types of sectors.206  
 
The CJEU has long continued to view the scope of operators in the same 
comparable factual and legal situation as relatively wide. 207  And when the 
Court looks at the scope of the scheme it is evident that the Court tends to 
use the objective pursued by the tax measure as a reference point from 
which the undertakings that are in a comparable factual and legal situation 
stem from.208  
 
The Commission states in their Notice that if a measure favours certain 
undertakings or production of certain goods in the abovementioned situation 
they are prima facie selective.209 
 
3.1.2.1.3 Third step: Justification of the measure by the nature of 
the general scheme of the system itself. 
 
The last step in the three-step assessment is to assess the question given that 
a measure is justified by the nature of the general scheme of the system 
itself.210 
 
                                                 
206 Ibid, para 52. 
207 C-279/08 P Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2011:551, paras 74-76; and Joined Cases 
C-78/08, C-79/08 & C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others, EU:C:2011:550, para 50.  
208 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 136. 
209 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 137. 
210 Ibid. paras 138-141; Commission Report of 9 February 2004 on the Implementation of 
the Commissions Notice on the Application of Aid Rules to measures to Direct Business 
Taxation, Brussels 09.02.2004. C (2004)434, paras 34-37. 
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There is a distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable selective 
measures relates to the objectives set forth by the reference system and that 
are inherent to the tax system and objectives which are found to be 
external.211  
 
An instance of a measure that would fall within the justification of the 
system is a tax structure covering economic policy-driven discrepancies, the 
taxpayers in the higher level of the tax rate would not be able to claim that 
the ones at the lower rate would receive beneficial treatment due to State 
aid.212 
 
The Court and the Commission has continued to take the view on the 
justification must be based on the intrinsic features of the general scheme of 
the system concerned. Moreover, it is up to the Member State to display 
how the derogation that of the tax measure is justifiable.213It is not 
sufficiently enough for the Member State to base the scope of the measure 
on objective means.214 
 
Additionally, it is also necessary to show that the exemptions don’t beyond 
what is necessary in relation to the principle of proportionality to achieve 
the legitimate objective of the system.215 
 
 Moreover, the State is required216 to apply necessary control and 
supervision procedures to ensure that the derogation is consistent within the 
logic and general scheme of the tax system in order to avoid tax elusion.217  
                                                 
211 Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/08 & C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others, EU:C:2011:550, 
paras 67-75; Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 139. 
212 Bacon, K. p. 90. 
213 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 141. 
214 C-409/00 Spain v Commission, EU:C:2003:92, para 49; and T-379/09 Italy v 
Commission, EU:T:2012:422, paras 47-48. 
215 Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/08 & C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others, EU:C:2011:550, 
para 75. 
216 See Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 140 (emphasis added). 
217 Ibid; and Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/08 & C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others, 
EU:C:2011:550, para 74. 
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3.1.2.1.4 The CJEUs derogation from the derogation method 
 
Often when the selectivity of measure is presented the measure is 
established not by the number of beneficiaries that are in the same 
comparable situation but rather from its effects, 218 - the undertaking 
excluded from the scope.219 This in particular with cases where the category 
of aid beneficiaries is predominantly broad.220 What is in important is the 
effects of the derogation.221 
 
The abovementioned reasoning was used by the CJEU when they overruled 
the GC judgment in the joined cases Commission and Spain v Government 
of Gibraltar and UK,222 The CJEU further explained that: 
 
 “Such an interpretation of the selectivity criterion would require, that in 
order for a tax system to be classifiable as ‘selective’ it must be designed in 
accordance with certain regulatory technique; the consequence of this 
would be that national tax rules fall from the outset outside the scope of 
control of State aid merely because they were adopted under a different 
regulatory technique although they produce the same effects in law and/or 
in fact. (cit).223 
 
In conclusion, what should be principally acknowledged from the Gibraltar-
case is that it is the very logic of the system per se and not the measure in 
                                                 
218 T-210/02 British Aggregates v Commission, EU:T:2006/253, para 85 & 89; joined Cases 
C-106/09 & C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and UK, 
EU:C:2011:732, para 87; and C-279/08 P Commission v Netherlands, EU:C:2011:551, para 
51. 
219 Nicolaides, P. p. 116. 
220 T-55/99 Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías v Commission, 
EU:T:2000:223, para 40. 
221 joined Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar 
and UK, EU:C:2011:732, para 87. 
222 joined Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar 
and UK, EU:C:2011:732. 
223 Ibid, para 92. 
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relation to the extent of effects of the measure taken.224 It can in other words 
be said that there exists a blur in the derogation method or more humorously 
said there exists a derogation in the derogation method, this notion is 
supported by Hofmann, H & Micheau, C.225 
 
 
3.1.3 APAs226: An Undertakings urge for 
transparency? 
 
Following the recent sections one can feasibly understand the magnitude of 
complexity and judicial uncertainty with regards to certain areas of tax 
measures in relation to EU State aid law. One parallel solution to the 
encumbrances within the judicial area has been incentives for tax 
transparency to tackle the issue at hand.227 
 
 In order to answer to the increasingly demand for legal certainty and 
stability and combating corporate tax avoidance, the Commission presented 
the tax transparency package in 2015.228 With the proposal comes an 
introduction for an automatic exchange of information of between Member 
States on their tax rulings.229 Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs, held that:  
 
"Tolerance has reached rock-bottom for companies that avoid paying their 
fair share of taxes, and for the regimes that enable them to do this. We have 
to rebuild the link between where companies really make their profits and 
where they are taxed. To do this, Member States need to open up and work 
                                                 
224 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 142. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Advanced Pricing Arrangements. 
227 See Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 169. 
228 European Commission Press Release, Combating corporate tax avoidance: Commission 
presents Tax Transparency Package, (2015). 
229 Ibid. 
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together. That is what today's Tax Transparency Package aims to 
achieve."(cit.).230 
 
APAs are initiated on request from respective taxpayers, i.e. multinational 
corporations interested in eliminating uncertainty.231  An APA is, a tax 
ruling, and: 
  
“An arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an 
appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate 
adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed 
period of time”(cit.).232 
 
APAs can be categorized into three different types: unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral APAs. Unilateral APAs in contrast to the other two categories 
cannot eliminate the juridical or economic double or non-taxation in the 
same extent.233This relates to a lack in consensus with other tax 
administrations and is underlined by OECD.234  
 
Tax rulings have developed globally as a consequence of a change in 
mentality from tax authorities, an aspiration for a higher degree of tax 
compliance and securer economic investments from multinational 
corporations and tax filers. Tax rulings are one of the instruments towards a 
more reciprocal relationship between the tax authorities and the taxpayer.235 
 
                                                 
230 Ibid. 
231 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, para (F3) 4.142. 
232 Ibid, para (F1) 4.123. 
233 Ibid, para. (F3) 4.145; and para (F4) 4.147. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Van De Welde, Elly, ’Tax rulings’ in the EU Member States – Study for ECON 
Committee, august, 2015. Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European parliament. 
[Online] Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/563447/IPOL_IDA(2015)5634
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One of the main objectives for an APA is to prescribe the taxpayer’s transfer 
pricing over a period of time. However, great attention must be taken into 
account in relation to the specificity of the APA. If the APA goes beyond its 
methodology, the way it will be applied, due to the fact that it relies on 
predicaments of the future.236The grant of a tax rulings, must however 
follow the rules of State aid.237 
 
Consequently, in the cases where a tax ruling gives an effect that departs 
from the ordinary tax reference system or general scheme in the sense that 
the tax ruling addressee differentiates from other operators that are in a 
comparable factual and legal situation, the ruling may confer a selective 
advantage.238 
 
3.1.3.1 The arm’s length principle  
 
The Arm’s length principle in the context of tax rulings and EU State aid 
regulation is the fact on which upon the Member States have agreed upon 
what should be used for determine transfer prices.239 The authoritative 
statement for ALP is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in the OECD Model 
Tax Convention: “…where the conditions between two enterprises 
commercial or financial relations should not differ from those which would 
be made between independent enterprises.”. (cit.)240 
 
In the Commission notice, 241 the Commission states that ALP forms part of 
the assessment of tax measures under Article 107 (1) TFEU, disregarded 
whether the principle is incorporated in the subject Member States national 
                                                 
236 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, para (F1) 4.124. 
237 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 170. 
238 Ibid. 
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Administrations, p. 23. 
240 Article 9, paragraph 1, OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 2014. 
241 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
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legal system. The principle is used by the Commission when assessing 
transfer pricing rulings with Article 107 (1) TFEU.242 However, the 
Commission points out in their notice that if a transfer pricing concurs with 
the guidance of ALP provided by the OECD, including the guidance on the 
most appropriate choice of transfer pricing method, a tax ruling approving 
that arrangement is unlikely to constitute State aid.243 
 
According to Pinto all measures having the effect of altering the standard 
method in order to determine the final taxable income may, including 
measures affecting the calculation of items, be considered as a reduction in 
the tax base ergo could result in a benefit.244  
 
 
3.1.3.2 The Commissions perspective on tax rulings 
and State aid selectivity  
 
The Commissions approach towards tax rulings and their relationship 
towards State aid selectivity is very clearly put forward in the Commission 
notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, by 
applying three main criteria. The following three criteria the Commission 
states may confer a selective element;245 
 
I. The ruling is not in coherence with national tax law which would 
result in a lower amount of tax.246 
 
This is when measure confers an advantage to the beneficiaries which would 
preclude or reduce costs that they normally would bear. Where a specific tax 
                                                 
242 Ibid, para 172. See also Commission Decision of 21 October 2015, State aid SA.38374 
implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, 2017/502/EC, Official Journal L 83, para 
264. 
243 Ibid, para 173. 
244 Pinto, p. 119. 
245 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 174. 
246 Ibid. (a). 
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exemption constitutes a tax advantage and reduces the beneficiary’s tax 
burden.247 
 
II. The ruling is unavailable to undertakings that are in a comparable 
legal and factual situation.248 
 
When assessing the scope of undertakings in a comparable situation, the 
Commission has had a wide perspective. When assessing the similar 
position the Commission has pointed out similar tax payers having 
comparable invested capital, turnover, employee situation amongst 
others.249 
 
III. The tax administration applies a more ‘favorable’ approach towards 
the tax treatment for a taxpayer in comparison to other taxpayers in 
a comparable legal and factual situation.250 
 
This, the Commission points out, could be the case if a tax administration 
deviates from the ALP due to the usage of a method that would depart from 
a reliable approximation of what would under normal circumstances be 
classified as a market-based outcome.251Furthermore, in addition, if the 
addressee of the ruling can use indirect methods for calculating taxable 
profits to its benefit.252  
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The abovementioned incitement for the Commission to confer selectivity on 
tax rulings that would depart from a reliable approximation of what would 
under normal circumstances be classified as a market-based outcome,253 has 
been a hot topic throughout the field of European State aid. I will in the next 
chapter discuss and analyse the recent case-law that shows the, intra-
relationship between the tax measure and the selectivity criterion.   
 
 
 
                                                 
17 February 2003, Belgian Coordination centres, 2003/757/EC, Official Journal L 282, 
paras 89-95. 
253 Commission Decision of 21 October 2015, State aid SA.38374 implemented by the 
Netherlands to Starbucks, 2017/502/EC, Official Journal L 83, paras 263-267 & 415-416. 
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4 Analysis 
 
Recent case-law distorting fiscal autonomy or 
levelling the playing field? 
 
The most recent cases in the field of European State aid, selectivity and tax 
measures is the The Banco Santander, World Duty Free & Santusa Holding 
case254 which the CJEU delivered its judgment in on the 21 of December 
2016,  and the Apple case255 during the past year. In the following sections, 
I will discuss the recent case law with a certain emphasis on the two main 
cases mentioned above. Furthermore, I will review the application of the 
derogation method in those cases and how it corresponds to the selectivity 
criterion and arm’s length principle.  
 
4.1.1  The Banco Santander, World Duty Free & 
Santusa Holding case 
 
Some of the most recent and influential decisions on fiscal selectivity are 
the decisions of the General Court in the World Duty Free Group and Banco 
Santander cases.256  
                                                 
254 Joined Cases C-20/15 P & C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free Group SA, 
(formerly Autogrill España SA), Banco Santander SA & Santusa Holding SL, 
EU:C:2016:981. Appealed, overruled and referred back to the General Court by the CJEU. 
255 See Commission Decision of 30 August 2016, Negative decision with recovery, 
SA.38373, Alleged aid to Apple, 2014/C , Brussels. 
256 Joined Cases C-20/15 P & C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free Group SA, 
(formerly Autogrill España SA), Banco Santander SA & Santusa Holding SL, 
EU:C:2016:981.  
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The background of the cases was a tax advantage that was enabling Spanish 
companies to amortize the financial goodwill resulting from the acquisition 
of shareholdings in foreign undertakings.257  
The General Court ruled that where a measure is a priori available to all 
relevant undertakings meeting relevant criteria, the measure will not be 
considered as selective.258  
The General Court argued in accordance of paragraph 36 of the judgment of 
8 November 2001 in Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer 
Zementwerke stating that: 
 ” A measure which is to be applied regardless of the nature of the activity 
of undertakings is not, in principle, selective”. (cit.)259  
The General Court found the Commission had failed to identify a category 
of undertakings, or commercial operations, that was exclusively favoured by 
the tax measures. Therefore, not rendering the measures as selective in the 
sense of Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
The Commission, however, appealed the General Court’s verdict, claiming 
that the General Court had erred in law and leaving the case to the European 
Court of Justice to decide upon. 
 The call for a legal relevance had long been due. Advocate General 
Wathelet delivered an opinion asserting that:” the ’selectivity’ criterion has 
long been one of the most controversial issues in the field of State aid. The 
appeals therefore offer the Court an opportunity to define the scope of that 
criterion, in particular with respect to tax measures.”.(cit)260  
                                                 
257 Ibid. 
258 C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline, EU:C:2001:598, para 36. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Opinion of the AG Wathelet to the judgment C-20/15 P & C-21/15 P Commission v 
Banco Santander and Santusa, ECLI:EU:C:2015:676, para 5. 
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Moreover, other semi-recent judgements such as GIL Insurance,261 British 
Aggregates Association262 & Netherlands v Commission,263 proves a more 
pro-derogation approach, where the measures seem to fall within  the 
derogation method.264  
According to the Opinion of AG Wathelet the General Court found a 
measure being selective based on the difference in treatment between 
categories of undertakings under the legislation of a single Member State 
rather than through the difference in treatment between undertakings of one 
Member State and those of other Member States in the World Duty Free 
Group and Banco Santander cases.265 Additionally, the a priori 
consideration that aimed, not at any particular category of undertaking or 
production, at a category of economic transactions was invalid.266 
 It is clear to see that the Advocate General delivers an opinion supporting 
the Commissions view of selectivity. But the Commissions approach is not 
novel, albeit, it is relying heavily upon two leading European Court 
judgments: to assert that the point of view is not newly fashioned.267  
The CJEU delivered its judgment, on the 21 of December, following in the 
line of the Commission and the AG Wathelet. The Court stated that when 
regarding case-law, a national measure has to be regarded as selective where 
the measure benefits exclusively undertakings that export goods or services, 
even though that may have been the case with respect to the particular tax 
measures at issue.268  
                                                 
261 C-308/01 GIL Insurance and others v Commissioners of Customs & Excise, 
EU:C:2004:252. 
262 T-210/02 British Aggregates v Commission, EU:T:2006/253. 
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266 Ibid. para 78. 
267 Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission, 
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EU:C:2016:981. para 118. 
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Moreover, the CJEU addressed the question of that the scope of 
undertakings that would fall into the category of being in a comparable legal 
and factual situation had to be defined as ‘export undertakings’, leaving the 
scope as have been shown through recent case-law admittedly broad.269 
It is, undoubtedly, clear to see that the CJEU has continued to reason, this in 
particular with cases where the category of aid beneficiaries is 
predominantly broad;270 what the essential burden on the element of 
selectivity is the effects of the aid given.271 Thus the court has as previously 
mentioned developed a new approach that entails a derogation from the 
derogation method – leaving a blur in fiscal State aid law. 
 
4.1.2 Belgium & Forum 187 v Commission272 & 
the Belgian Coordination Centres273 
 
In Belgium & Forum 187 v Commission the Court required that it be 
determined whether, under a statutory scheme; a State measure is such as to 
favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in 
comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by the 
system in question, are in a comparable ’legal and factual’ situation.274  
A Commission decision following the Belgium & Forum 187 v Commission 
– judgment was the Belgian Coordination Centres – decision275. In general, 
Belgian Coordination Centres involved tax benefits that Belgium granted to 
                                                 
269 Ibid, para 117. 
270 T-55/99 Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías v Commission, 
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Belgian undertakings that provided certain services to members of a 
multinational group. In the decision, the Commission first found that the 
regime conferred an economic advantage because the benefits granted were 
not generally available under a normal application of the Belgian tax 
system. Secondly, the Commission separately analysed whether these 
advantages were selective.276  
 
According to the US Treasury Department, the Commission has been 
relying heavily on the decision in its opening and final decisions in the State 
aid cases following the recent State aid investigations, However, stating that 
the Commission has assessed the case differently in the more up to date 
Apple-case.277  
 
The criticism deriving from the U.S. Treasury Department claims that in the 
Apple-case the Commission adopted a more aggressive approach and 
intersected the advantage and selectivity criterion which is more evidently 
shown in the Fiat and Starbucks decisions where the Commission states:278 
 
“where a tax measure results in an unjustified reduction of the tax liability 
of a beneficiary who would otherwise be subject to a higher level of tax 
under the reference system, that reduction constitutes both the advantage 
granted by the tax measure and the derogation from the system of 
reference.”.(cit).279  
 
                                                 
276 Ibid, paras 104-112. 
277 United States Department of the Treasury White Paper, The European Commissions 
recent State aid investigations of transfer pricing rulings, 24 august, 2016. [Online] 
Available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf [Accessed 26 may. 2017]. 
278 Ibid, p. 8. 
279 Commission Decision of 21 October 2015, State aid SA.38374 implemented by the 
Netherlands to Starbucks, 2017/502/EC, Official Journal L 83; and Commission Decision 
of 21 October 2015, State aid SA.38375 which Luxembourg granted Fiat, 2016/2326/EC, 
Official Journal L 351. 
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I agree with the criticism deriving from the U.S. Treasury Department, but 
one has also to bear in mind, that the set forth objectives of the SAM 2014 
was to target more specific States aids.280   
 
4.1.3 Commission v Gibraltar281 
 
Nevertheless, in the other case that often is referred to by the Commission is 
the case Commission v Gibraltar282. There the Court reaffirms its clear 
position of fiscal State aid selectivity as a tax measure derogating from the 
‘normal’ tax regime.283  
The Court stated in the Gibraltar-case that; tax measures, even though, 
founded on criteria that are in themselves of a general nature, can in practice 
discriminate between companies in a comparable situation with regard to the 
objective of the proposed tax reform; which was to introduce a general 
system of taxation and therefore be regarded as selective.284That it is the 
very logic of the system per se and not the measure in relation to the extent 
of effects of the measure taken.285  
It is clear that the distinction between general and selective measures is 
subject to considerable controversy and continues to fuel quite a large 
debate. This in part, explains the US Treasury’s claim that the Commissions 
approach deviates from prior EU case law following the Apple Inc. 
investigation.286 However bearing in mind of the historical aspects of 
European State aid law, what is proven is that the area is truly an ever-
changing legal spine where the Commissions policy framework brings flesh 
to the Court’s bones.287  
                                                 
280 Cf. Section 2.1.4.2. 
281 C-106/09 Commission v Gibraltar, ECLI:EU:C:2011:732. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid, paras 36 and 90; see also section 3.1.2.1 The Derogation Method.  
284C-106/09 Commission v Gibraltar, ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, paras 100-101. 
285 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 142. 
286 United States Department of the Treasury White Paper, The European Commissions 
recent State aid investigations of transfer pricing rulings, 24 august, 2016.  
287 Cf. Chapter 2 History of State aid law in the EU. 
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4.1.4 The Apple case 
 
The Commission with both the Belgium and Forum 187 as well as the 
Gibraltar-cases find the Apple case in accordance with EU case law and the 
only thing deviating, are Apple subsidies receiving preferential treatment in 
comparison to the ‘normal’ tax regime. The commission has stated that the: 
 
 “decision does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or its 
corporate tax rate.”288  
 
Although, the statement is in my opinion fairly controversial. We have seen 
from the previous chapters on the very importance of a functional fiscal 
autonomy to the extent that an arm’s length principle or ‘normal’ tax policy 
remains may be derived from it. It furthermore questions the given pseudo-
legal tax ruling that attempts to resolve the issue of legal uncertainty at 
hand. Notwithstanding, there are given reasons to not look as far too kindly 
on the Apple case, as due to the allocation method used in the tax rulings, 
Apple only paid an effective corporate tax rate that declined from 1% in 
2003 to 0.005% in 2014 on the profits of Apple Sales International.289 
 
In the Commission press release for the Apple case the Commission states 
that, the Commission’s investigation reveals that the tax rulings issued by 
Ireland endorsed an artificial internal allocation of profits within ASI and 
AOE, which has no factual or economic justification.290 What the 
commission aims for with the statement is in my opinion the derogation 
method. Or more precisely held that the derogation cannot be applied 
towards the Apple case rendering it incompatible with Union Law.  
                                                 
288 Press Statement by the European Commission, State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax 
benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion, (2016).  
289 Press Statement by the European Commission, State aid: Ireland gave illegal tax 
benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion, (2016). 
290Ibid. 
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However, the Commission also stresses in the letter to the Member State the 
Republic of Ireland, published on the 20 of March 2017, that with regards to 
the selective nature of an advantage, the CJEU has previously held that in 
the case of an individual aid measure, as opposed to a scheme, “the 
identification of the economic advantage is, in principle, sufficient to 
support the presumption that it is selective”291, without it being necessary to 
analyse the selectivity of the measure according to the derogation method 
devised by the CJEU for fiscal State aid schemes292  
 
This entails, in my perspective, that the Commissions view of the advantage 
in the Apple case would already be found to be selective in nature. This is 
supported the commissions reasoning in the letter to the Member State.293 
The reasoning is also falls within according to, my opinon, the CJEUs ruling 
of the Gibraltar case - that it is the very logic of the system per se.294 
Although, the Commission still examines the tax benefits Apple case 
through the three-step-analysis (derogation method).295 This illustrates, in 
my opinion, how inclined the Commission is when it comes to the 
derogation method in defining tax measures as selective.  
 
Apple argues in the case that the reference system should be understood as 
the commission interpreted it in the Groepsrentebox Decision296. In the 
decision, the Commission allegedly acknowledged economic dealings 
between undertakings belonging to a corporate group and intra-group 
transactions. The motive was that they weren’t driven by the same 
competitive and economic rationale as those between unrelated 
                                                 
291 C-270/15 P Belgium v Commission, EU:C:2016:489, para 49; and C-15/14 P 
Commission v MOL, EU:C:2015:362, para 60. 
292 Cf. T-385/12 Orange v Commission EU:T:2015:117, para 53. 
293 Commission Decision of 30 august 2016, State aid SA.38373 implemented by Ireland to 
Apple, Brussels, C (2016), 5605 final, paras 223-224. 
294 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 142. 
295 Ibid, para 224. 
296 Commission decision of 8 July 2009, State aid C 4/2007 (ex N 465/2006) on the 
Groepsrentebox scheme which the Netherlands is planning to implement, 04.11.2009, 
Official Journal L 288. 
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companies.297 Albeit, the Commission here considers in the terms of ALP. 
In other words, according to the Commission the ALP declares that, it 
shouldn’t differ between independent companies and financial relations 
between related companies conducting internal dealings.298 
 
The commission states in the letter to the Member State the Republic of 
Ireland, published on the 20 of March 2017, that the purposes of tax rulings 
are to on the forehand establish an application of the ordinary tax system to 
a particular case in view of its specific facts and circumstances. Although, 
indifferent from other tax measures, the ruling must adhere to Union law. 299  
 
If a ruling derogates from the general scheme or nature of the ‘norm’ tax 
system it has to be justified without justification, that ruling may confer a 
selective advantage upon the addressee.300  
 
One thing the commissions does not collaborate on it letter is that the CJEU 
has had the derogation method consistently up on the table however the 
CJEU has been reluctant in the conclusion that selectivity can only stem 
from a system to which all the undertakings are subject. 301  
 
4.1.5 Personal remarks 
 
When looking back on the presented material and the development of the 
recent case-law in combination of the underlining interrelationship between 
national fiscal measures and European State aid rules. In the light of the 
objectives of a tax measure the selectivity criterion tax are precipitously 
applied where the Courts and the commission seemingly apply a wide scope 
                                                 
297 Ibid, para 85. 
298 Ibid, para 251. 
299 Commission Decision of 30 august 2016, State aid SA.38373 implemented by Ireland to 
Apple, Brussels, C (2016), 5605 final, para 244. 
300 Ibid.  
301 see i.e. joined Cases C-106/09 & C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and UK, EU:C:2011:732, para 92. 
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on the application of the derogation method.302 There exists however 
considerable controversy in the distinction of general and selective fiscal 
State measures and tax rulings that continuously fuels the debate.  
The entire legal question boils down into two key ingredients; on one hand 
the freedom and sovereignty for each Member State to enjoy fiscal 
autonomy and on the other the pursuit of following State aid regulations to 
safeguard an effective level of internal market competition. It is working as 
a scale between these two interests, seeing, as there is a need for balance in 
order to reach certain consensus.  
Both the Courts and the Commission express that it falls within the 
competence of the Member States or of infra-State bodies having fiscal 
autonomy, in the absence of European Union rules governing the matter due 
to a lack of Member State fiscal harmonization, to designate bases of 
assessment and to spread the tax burden across the different factors of 
production and economic sectors. 303  However, when conducting such 
burdens, adhere to Union law.304  
Therefore, in my opinion, there is no surprise that when following the steps 
of reforms such as SAAP305 and SAM306, the Commission requires a more 
unilateral approach of ALPs - or at least in the area of fiscal rulings. It was 
therefore, no coincidence, that along with the tax transparency package in 
2015307 the proposal came with an introduction for an automatic exchange 
of information between Member States on their tax rulings in my opinion. 
                                                 
302 C-172/03 Heiser, EU:C:2005:130, paras 33 & 35; Furthermore, see the Opinion of AG 
Tizzano in the same judgement, EU:C:2004:678, para 58. 
303 Commission notice on the notion of State aid as referred to Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
(C/2016/2946), para 156. 
304 Ibid. 
305 State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid 
reform, Brussels 2005-2009. 
306 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, and the committee of the Regions, EU State 
Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM/2012/0209. 
307 European Commission Press Release, Combating corporate tax avoidance: Commission 
presents Tax Transparency Package, (2015). 
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State aid is, as described, one of many tools to assure that the internal 
market competition functions properly, enhancing economic efficiency.308 
The four cumulative criteria that must be upheld for a measure to be 
considered as State aid;309 As we have seen, fits most fiscal measure with 
the criteria, albeit, there is a legal debate of when conferring an advantage is 
seen as selective, this especially perhaps, is due to the fact that even though 
substantive amounts of case-law emanating from the Courts, there is still a 
lack of coherence between the Court and the Commission, for instance, 
when it comes to the derogation method. A method often used by the 
Commission but by the Courts not a definite safe harbor.310  
The underlying fundamental principle for State aid regulation relying on the 
belief that free competition based on equal and non-discriminatory treatment 
of every undertaking will ensure optimal economic efficiency. Hence, an 
uneven treatment towards certain undertakings in the form of, inter alia, tax 
exempts and other fiscal measures creating preferential economic treatment 
between comparable undertakings will likely distort competition and 
possibly have an effect on trade between the Member States.311 
However, tax rulings are one of the instruments towards a more reciprocal 
relationship between the tax authorities and the taxpayers, with an aim from 
the applicant to compliance and legal certainty. However, a tax ruling 
including APAs must factually correspond and correlate with an economic 
reality.312 
 The argument of legal uncertainty in tax rulings when the Commission 
intervenes has to be backed up with both factual and legal evidence 
corresponding to an economic reality according to my personal opinion. 
                                                 
308 Hofmann, H & Micheau, C. p. 3. 
309 Cf. Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
310 See section 3.1.2.1.4. 
311 Luengo, G. p. 3-4. 
312 Commission Decision of 21 October 2015, State aid SA.38374 implemented by the 
Netherlands to Starbucks, 2017/502/EC, Official Journal L 83, paras 263-267 & 415-416; 
and Commission Decision of 21 October 2015, State aid SA.38375 which Luxembourg 
granted Fiat, 2016/2326/EC, Official Journal L 351, para 227. 
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Moreover, when addressing the legal part, it is up to the CJEU to provide a 
clear and consistent case-law.  
The most recent cases World Duty Free Group and Banco Santander cases 
does awake certain concern. The General Court stated that where a measure 
is a priori available to all relevant undertakings meeting relevant criteria, 
the measure will not be considered as selective. Although, one has to bear in 
mind that this judgment was met with criticism from both the Commission 
and the Advocate General and was later on overruled by the CJEU.313 Still, 
the seemingly differentiated application of conferring selectivity towards tax 
rulings between the CJEU and the GC does emphasize the existence of a 
remaining blur in the field of State aid applied to fiscal measures. 
My personal view regarding the case, goes in line with the commissions 
view, perhaps best illustrated, with the AG Opinion.314 Since, when 
undertakings benefit from a tax measure, that would not be entitled to them 
under the normal fiscal regime, and result in a tax advantage that cannot be 
claimed by other undertakings performing similar operations and as such, in 
virtue, are in a comparable situation. Such a measure constitutes, de facto, a 
selective measure in nature; because, contrary to what the General Court 
claims, it does not actually apply to all economic operators. 
What is interesting is the approach from the CJEU that to certain extent 
departs from the normal three step analysis, better known as the derogation 
method, and have incorporated a new criterion in the form of potential 
effects. I therefore consider that, de lege feranda, the three-step-analysis 
ought to be expanded for legal clarity into the following method: 
In order to classify a national tax measure as selective the following 
criteria should be considered when deciding upon if a tax measure 
confers selectivity; 
 
                                                 
313 Joined Cases C-20/15 P & C-21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free Group SA, 
(formerly Autogrill España SA), Banco Santander SA & Santusa Holding SL, 
EU:C:2016:981.  
314 Opinion of the AG Wathelet to the judgment C-20/15 P & C-21/15 P Commission v 
Banco Santander and Santusa, EU:C:2015:676. 
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a. Firstly, by identifying the ordinary or ‘normal’ tax system 
applicable, and thereafter demonstrate that;  
 
b. the tax measure is a ‘derogation’ from that ordinary reference 
system or general scheme in the sense that it differentiates from 
other operators that are in a comparable factual and legal situation 
or deviates from the arm’s length principle or methodology applied 
to ensure a reliable approximation of what would under normal 
circumstances be classified as a market-based outcome;  
 
c. that the measure is not justified by ‘the nature or general scheme of 
the system’ or by the very logic of the system per se and in other 
words not by the measure in relation to the extent of effects of the 
measure taken. 
 
 The World Duty Free Group and Banco Santander cases proved that there 
was and still is a seemingly apparent legal hotspur within the area of 
European State aid; it is not clarified and settled in how the selectivity 
criterion ought to be interpreted in fiscal State measures. Additionally, I do 
support the belief given by the US Treasury Dept. that; in this ambiguous 
area, the interpretation of the European State aid rules has developed a new 
and different mentality, that is much more aggressive towards multinational 
corporations.315  
Nevertheless, I do not agree with the US Treasury Dept. that the 
commission has adopted an entirely new and different case law. Both the 
Belgium & Forum 187 v Commission & Commission v Gibraltar support the 
Commissions decisions.  Nevertheless, the Commission seems to be taking 
a new step in joining the advantage and selectivity criterion which is more 
evidently shown in the Fiat and Starbucks decisions. Where the commission 
stated that: “tax measure results in an unjustified reduction of the tax 
liability of a beneficiary who would otherwise be subject to a higher level of 
                                                 
315 Cf. United States Department of the Treasury White Paper, The European Commission’s 
recent State aid investigations of transfer pricing rulings, 24 august, 2016.  
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tax under the reference system, that reduction constitutes both the 
advantage granted by the tax measure and the derogation from the system 
of reference.”.316 This is understandable as the criteria are somewhat 
intersected in their application to Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
But seeing as State aid control is an everchanging area the past two decades 
the legal framework of State aid in the Union has gone through a review and 
produced a large amount of texts with the aim of making the legal 
framework simpler and more understandable/transparent in relation to State 
aid review, a so called ‘codification’ manifested in the Commissions 
Practice and the Courts case law. 317 Whether the abovementioned has 
provided more guidance or not I leave to the reader to decide upon; one 
thing is, however, sure - and that is that it continues to fuel a debate between 
NCAs, National tax authorities, the Commission, the CJEU and operators on 
the market. 
Lastly, as the thesis have shown European State aid rules have a rather great 
effect and impact on the seemingly reserved right to fiscal autonomy of the 
Member States. What the Court’s verdict will be in the Apple-case remains 
to be unveiled.  
When I first found out about the Apple case a year ago, I told my associate 
professor and senior lecturer Jörgen Hettne at the Lund University 
Department of Business Law that my personal belief was that the CJEU 
would change the General Court’s judgment in the the World Duty Free 
Group and Banco Santander cases and that the cases would in turn provide 
further guidance in how selectivity should be interpreted once and for all in 
fiscal State measures.  
Additionally, a new Commission Notice on fiscal State measures and 
European State aid would not be unexpected as well as the areas have grown 
and developed both in its broad range and complexity. The remarkable part 
                                                 
316 see State aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks, Commission Decision 
COMP/SA.38374, Oct. 21, [2015] & State aid which Luxembourg granted to Fiat, 
Commission Decision COMP/SA.38375, Oct. 21, [2015]. 
317 See section 2.1.4. 
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is that in so far, my preliminary remarks of the case a year ago, have all 
succeeded. And, along those lines it would not be farfetched for me to give 
my assumption of the potential judgment in the Apple case at hand for the 
CJEU. 
My take on the Apple case is that the CJEU will have the same approach as 
the Commission and furthermore expand the case-law within the area by 
looking at the potential harmful effects to undertakings that would have 
reasonably been considered to be in the same factual and legal comparable 
situation. Thus, in light of the foregoing I believe the CJEU will find that 
the tax rulings provided by Irish Revenue in favour of Apple Sales 
International (ASI) and Apple Operations Europe (AOE) confer a selective 
advantage.  
Furthermore, I have confidence in that the Court will address the issue at 
hand with regards to the effects of the measure as well as the logic of the 
system per se and conclude that when staying under the umbrella of the 
arm’s length principle the methodology applied to ensure a reliable 
approximation of what would under normal circumstances be classified as a 
market-based outcome is in the case not justified by the nature of the legal 
system. After all, when looking to the objectives of the system, it’s hard to 
imagine that the tax base for Apple is in line with the objectives set forth. 
But it is yet for the CJEU to decide. 
The most recent cases World Duty Free Group and Banco Santander cases 
does awake certain concern. Still, the seemingly differentiated application of 
conferring selectivity towards tax rulings between the CJEU and the GC 
does emphasize that there is a remaining blur in the field of EU State aid 
law applied to fiscal measures. 
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5 Conclusions 
To conclude this thesis, the modern European economies rely heavily on 
markets and undertakings to decide what markets to expand into, what 
goods to sell and what R&D to undertake etc.  The underlying fundamental 
principle to ensure that the clockwork keeps on ticking is free competition 
based on equal and non-discriminatory treatment of every undertaking will 
ensure optimal economic efficiency.  
The evolution of European State aids began with the Treaty of Paris in 
1951, which gave rise to the ECSC. The objective at that time was to 
maintain post-war peace and reconcile two political powers, Germany and 
France. Today, however, the past two decades have marked the legal 
framework of State aid in the Union by key aspects such as: Transparency, 
Modernization and a more economic point of view.   
The legal framework has gone through a review and produced a large 
amount of texts with the aim of making the legal framework simpler and 
more understandable/transparent in relation to State aid review, a so called 
‘codification’ manifested in the Commissions Practice and the Courts case-
law. However, this has also contributed to the complexity of the area that 
now withholds a large amount of Commission Policy Framework. 
The famous wording of Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods, insofar as it affects trade between 
Member States.  
The selectivity criterion ‘favouring certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods’ is, one of the most defining criteria for State aid. The 
criterion additionally raises complex questions in tax measures since there is 
no community-level harmonisation of the tax provisions of the Member 
States. The Commission very clearly States in their notice that Member 
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States freely can decide upon the most appropriate economic policy and tax 
burden they see fit and fall within their competence due to natural fiscal 
autonomy. However, when exercising such policies, they must follow Union 
Law. 
The selective advantage may derive from an exception to the tax provisions 
of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature or from a discretionary 
practice on the part of the tax authorities. However, the selective nature of a 
measure may be justified by ‘the nature or general scheme of the system’. 
The methodology to the abovementioned derogation has also been coined 
through the case-law as the derogation method. Sometimes this justification 
has also been referred by the Court as the ‘nature or structure’ or ‘logic’ of 
the system, and applies almost exclusively to tax measures. 
 
Due to the complexity and judicial uncertainty with regards to certain areas 
of tax measures in relation to EU State aid law. One solution to the 
encumbrances within the judicial area has been incentives for tax 
transparency. Furthermore, have tax rulings, APAs and other tax perceiving 
measures has been developed globally as a consequence of a change in 
mentality from tax authorities, an ambition for a higher degree of tax 
compliance and securer economic investments from multinational 
corporations and tax filers. However, this has also give rise to, as evidently 
shown in the recent cases brought up by the thesis, a legal hotspur. Where 
the Commission has been the pot stirrer in the interrelationship between 
national fiscal autonomy, larger multinational companies and the EU’s State 
aid rules.  
Some of the most recent and influential decisions on fiscal selectivity are 
the decisions of the General Court in the World Duty Free Group and Banco 
Santander cases. The CJEU overruled the GC in the case stating that a 
national measure has to be regarded as selective where the measure benefits 
exclusively undertakings that export goods or services, even though that 
might not have been the case with respect to the particular tax measures at 
issue.  
 75 
Based on the application of the selectivity criterion in tax measures and in 
specific relation to the derogation method, I have found that, de lege 
feranda, application of the three-step-analysis ought to be expanded with the 
elements of a deviation from the arm’s length principle or the methodology 
applied to ensure a reliable approximation of what would under normal 
circumstances be classified as a market-based outcome. In addition to the 
developments of the Court that the where a measure is not justified by ‘the 
nature or general scheme of the system’ or by the very logic of the system 
per se or not by the measure in relation to the extent of effects of the 
measure taken may confer selectivity in relation to Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
However, bearing in mind of the historical aspects of European State aid 
law, what is proven is that the area is truly an ever-changing legal spine, 
unlike other competition law areas, where the Commissions policy 
framework brings flesh to the Court’s bones. Therefore, little can be 
speculated how we look at State aid in the next 60 years. One thing is 
ensured however, and that is that it will continue to fuel a wide debate 
amongst the Member States,  
 In other words – It’s a great time to be a competition lawyer! 
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